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This research explains the factors behind the variation of enterprise creation
across countries by looking at the roles of formal and informal institutions and their
interactions in the distribution of start-up enterprises in the formal and informal sectors. It
tests two competing hypotheses about the individual versus mixed effects of formal
institutions (measured by entry regulations) and informal institutions (measured by social
capital) on entrepreneurship. The research uses quantitative analysis of data from 48
countries and a qualitative case study of Madagascar.
The findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses are consistent
regarding the independent effects of each set of institutions in the distribution of
entrepreneurship in both sectors while controlling for political and economic variables
(level of economic development, political stability, and control of corruption). They
confirm the hypothesis that the formal institution is inversely related to formal
entrepreneurship and the informal institution is positively related to informal
entrepreneurship. The findings from the two studies disagree on the role of institutional
interaction on entrepreneurship. The quantitative analysis did not find any relationship,
whereas the case study finds that the interaction of entry regulations and the informal
institutions of fihavanana (Malagasy social capital), tsiny (reproach), and tody
(retribution) determines the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal and informal

market. The interaction occurs in the bureaucratic arena, which handles business entry
procedures, and is driven by the imbalance between the strength of the two institutions.
The findings from the research help us understand in a better way the mechanism
that explains the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sector in
Africa and especially the predominance of informal sector in the region. They also
provide new insights about the ways to handle and promote institutional reforms when
formal and informal institutions diverge.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Research Question
There is a significant discrepancy in entrepreneurship across the world in light the
data of enterprise creation as a percentage of GDP from 66 countries during the period of
2001 to 2008.1 The average rate of global enterprise creation is 10.6% of GDP, with the
developing countries surprisingly having higher rate than the developed ones. Peru has
the highest rate of entrepreneurship (33% of GDP), whereas Japan has the lowest (3.2%
of GDP). The variation is even puzzling when we look at the differences among regions,
as illustrated in Figure 1.1.2 The average rate among between regions is 12.98% of GDP,
with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) having has the highest rate (19.87% of GDP) and the
OECD countries having have the lowest (7.08% of GDP). These statistics apparently
contradict the conventional wisdom according to which better institutions (both formal
and informal) and higher levels of economic development as well as political stability are
positively associated with entrepreneurship.
For that purpose, this research will attempt to explain the institutional factors
behind the variation in enterprise creation across the world by answering the following

1

International Entrepreneurship Organization & the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Data.
The regions are Asian Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East
and North Africa, OECD, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
2

1

2
question: Do individual institutions (formal and informal institutions) or their interactions
matter for the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sector?

Total Entrepreneurship Activity Per
Region
19.87 %

18.2 %
14.69 %
10.86 %
7.15 %

Asian Pacific
Countries

Europe and
Central Asian
Countries

7.08 %

Latin America
and Caribbean
Countries

Middle East
and North
African
Countries

OECD
Countries

Sub Saharan
Countries

Figure 1.1. Total Entrepreneurship Activity per Region (International Entrepreneurship
2009)
The dissertation tests competing hypotheses about the individual versus
interaction effects of formal institutions (measured by entry regulations) and informal
institutions (measured by social capital) on entrepreneurship in the formal and informal
market. It uses two methods to conduct the analysis. The first method is a quantitative
analysis of data from 48 countries during the period of 2004 to 2006, whereas the second
is a qualitative case study of Madagascar. Special attention will be given to SSA
countries where institutions are weak and detrimental to the economic sectors (e.g.,
Bayart 1993; Fosu 1992; Hyden 2008), yet the statistics about the worldwide total
entrepreneurship shows that SSA has the highest rate of enterprise creation. The
dependent variable in this study is entrepreneurship or business entry in the formal and
informal sector, whereas the independent variables are entry regulations as formal

3
institutions, social capital as informal institutions, and institutional interactions. The
control variables consist of level of economic development, political stability, and control
of corruption.
1.2. Contribution of the Research
The main contribution of this research is to fill the gap in the study of the roles of
formal and informal institutions on entrepreneurship. Previous researches looked at the
individual and independent effects of each institution on entrepreneurship (e.g., Black
and Strahan 2002; Hause and Du Rietz 1984; Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2006; Djankov
et al. 2002). These studies seem to omit or underrate some of the important characteristics
of institutions such as the process and outcomes of the interactions of informal and
formal institutions. Their findings were not clear whether the effect of institutions on
entrepreneurship using the interaction term is similar or different when the two
institutions are used separately. The use of quantitative analysis of data from 48 countries
as well as the qualitative case study of Madagascar should clarify the issue related to the
individual versus interaction effects of formal and informal institutions on
entrepreneurship.
The research also contributes to our understanding of the individual and
interaction effects of institutions on entrepreneurship in SSA. This topic is relevant to the
study of African institutions and African political economy because of the strength
imbalance between formal and informal institutions in Africa. Formal institutions are
weak, and informal institutions are more prevalent in determining people’s behavior and
decisions (e.g., Bates 1984; Bratton 2007). The qualitative case study of Madagascar

4
provides better explanation about the roles of formal institution (business entry
regulations) and the informal institutions of fihavanana (Malagasy social capital), tsiny
(blame and reproach), and tody (retribution) on entrepreneurship. It shows the multidimensions of each set of institutions, the complexity of their interactions and their
effects on entrepreneurship.
Overall, this research is then relevant to political science, political economy, and
is helpful for practitioners. Democracy and entrepreneurship are closely linked because
they are two dimensions of freedom.3 On the one hand, the ability to start and have a
business is an expression of individual rights to exploit his initiative and control the fruits
of his labor, which makes democracy important for entrepreneurship. On the other hand,
entrepreneurship is important for democracy because entrepreneurs provide choices to
consumers by putting new products and ideas in the market place and challenge
government roles in creating and ensuring effective policy that promote growth and
prosperity. Understanding institutions and their interactions is crucial in the design and
delivery of institutional arrangements that promote the creation of enterprise in different
political systems. Determining institutional combinations that foster business creation
matters to democracy and development. The success in enterprise creation may contribute
to a country’s overall economic growth through the ripple effects of job and wealth
creation, poverty reduction, hence reaching the Millennium Development Goals. Finally,
understanding the institutional context, its roles and synergy will allow entrepreneurs to
make informed decision in their investment plan.

3

Steyaert (2000), Johnson (2005), and others fully addressed this issue.
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1.3. Literature Review
Institutions are rules and procedures that structure human behavior, and have
sanction mechanisms when they are not followed. They are “the rules of the game”
(Kreps 1990; North 1990) that govern, shape, and influence relations among individuals
(Lin and Nugent 1995). They structure people’s interactions by constraining and enabling
actors’ behavior and actions especially establishing the incentive structure and economic
performance of a society (Carey 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Knight 1992; North
1990, 1994). They include the formal constraints (laws, constitutions) and informal
constraints (culture, customs, values, traditions) that form and influence the interactions
of economic actors (North 1990).
Formal and informal institutions are extremes on the institution continuum, even
though most institutions combine both elements (Pande and Udry 2006). Their
interactions lead to stronger and more defined human behavior. On the one hand, formal
institutions are official rules and procedures. They are “created, communicated, and
enforced through channel widely accepted as official: state institutions, state-enforced
rules, and ‘organizational rules’” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727).4 On the other hand,
informal institutions are socially shared rules, values, and norms. They are shared
subjective knowledge in a society, which are usually unwritten (Licht and Siegel 2006).
They “are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned
channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). They are “important in business

4

Extensive discussions about formal institutions are found in Aidis, Estrin, and Michiewicz 2007;
Buchanan and Tullock 1962; North 1990; and Rodrick 1995.
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transactions in both rich countries and poor countries” (World Bank 2002, 4) because of
their subtle effects (Veblen 1970).5
Both formal and informal institutions shape economic activities. Therefore, they
matter for entrepreneurship. In this context, entrepreneurship covers any entrepreneurial
activities both in the formal and informal market and in all economies. To this end,
entrepreneurship is defined “the manifest ability and willingness of individuals, on their
own, in teams, within and outside existing organizations” to perceive and exploit
economic opportunities into the market in face of uncertainty (Wennekers and Thurik
1999, 46-47). This definition covers the general concepts of entrepreneurship mentioned
in the literature.6
The literature shows that institutions help determine whether somebody can
become entrepreneur or not, whether the environment is favorable for entrepreneurship or
not, and whether an entrepreneur should take risk or not. Institutions form economic
actors: “their preferences, values, internalized norms, intrinsic motivation, etc.” (Held
and Nutzinger 2003, 237). Entry regulations as a measure of formal institutions (e.g.,
Rodrik 1990, 2000; Soto 1990; World Bank 2002; van Stel, Storey, and Thurik 2006) and

5

They also “shape the performance of formal institutions in important and often unexpected ways”
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 726). Their change is very slow and occurs more indirectly and usually as a
result of accidents, learning, and natural selection and in the passage of time (North 1990, 88).
6
Scholars do not agree on the definition and measure of entrepreneurship (Hébert and Link 1989; Bull
and Willard 1993; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Praag 1999). The Knightian approach defines entrepreneurship
as risk-taking activities, which assume uncertainties (Knight 1921). The Schumpeterian approach considers
entrepreneurial activity as a process of innovation, which is a critical part of the process of creative
destruction that ensures the dynamism of the modern economy (Schumpeter 1934, 1943, 1949, 1991). The
Kirznerian and Schlutz approach sees entrepreneurship as exploitation of opportunities and the ability to
deal with economic disequilibrium (Kirzner 1973; Schlutz 1975). Most of the recent approaches suggest
entrepreneurship as the combination of the presence of lucrative opportunities and entrepreneurs (Shane
and Venkataraman, 2000; Casson 2003). Despite the lack of unanimity, most scholars agree that
entrepreneurship involves initiative taking, the organizing and reorganizing of social and economic
mechanisms to turn resources and situations to practical account, and the acceptance of risk or failure
(Hisrich, Peters, and Shepherd 2005).
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social capital as a measure of informal institutions (e.g., Svendsen and Svendsen 2004;
Fukuyama 1995, 2001) have been identified to have significant effects on
entrepreneurship when analyzed separately.
Much of the literature on entrepreneurship examines the individual role of formal
and informal institutions on business start-ups. It argues that each set of institutions
affects the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sector. Theoretical
and empirical evidences show that regulations, even though necessary, hinder
entrepreneurship and its formalization.7 Burdensome or excessive regulations are
disincentive to entrepreneurship in the formal sector because of the cost of uncertainties
that accompany them (e.g., Desai, Gompers, and Lerner 2003; Klapper, Leaven, and
Rajan 2006; Scarpetta et al. 2002). As a consequence, higher levels of bureaucratic
inefficiency promote corruption, which in turn leads to the expansion of the informal
sector (e.g., Djankov 2009; van Stel, Storey, and Thurik 2006). Regulatory entry burdens
are a major variable that explains the low entry rates in developing countries (Soto 1990).
Even though it is accepted that an inverse relationship exists between regulation and
entrepreneurship, the effect is complex due to the different arguments about the purpose
of entry regulations either they are necessary to reduce market inefficiencies or they
provide benefits to special interests.8

7

Both cross country and single country studies (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, Russia) show the negative
relationship between entry regulations and entrepreneurship (e.g., Bruhn 2008; Djankov 2009; Kaplan,
Piedra, and Seira 2007; Monteiro and Assuncao 2006; Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2007).
8
The Public Interest theory advances that regulation is a screening system of new entrants to ensure
consumer satisfaction and prevent externalities that might harm the public (e.g., Djankov 2009; Pigou
1938). The Public Choice theory argues that regulation provides benefits to special interest groups such as
industries, politicians, and bureaucrats at the cost of efficiency and well-being (e.g., Djankov 2009; Stigler
1971; Tullock 1967).
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The relationship between social capital and entrepreneurship has been
documented in the literature. The argument is that social capital positively affects
economic activities, thus contributing to enterprise creation. From this perspective, social
capital is a set of social network and attitude that provide social cohesion, which in turn
affect people’s action. It includes both structural (networking) and attitudinal (values,
norms) components.9 The concept of networking and norms of trust generate expectations
of cooperation between actors, which has effects on economic activities by lowering
transaction costs (Arrow 1972, 1974; Fukuyama 1995). Empirical studies show that
social capital induces entrepreneurship both in the formal or informal sector because of
its multiple effects (e.g., Deakins et al. 2007; Davidsson and Honig 2003; Landry,
Amara, and Lamari 2000, 2002). It influences trust-based behavior that facilitates
cooperation, ensures information flow through networking, forms and enforces the
entrepreneur’s credibility vis-à-vis partners and customers, thus reducing transaction
costs (e.g., Arrow 1972, 1974; Fukuyama 1995, 1999, 2001).
Even though the literature is unanimous about the individual effects of formal
institutions (entry regulations) and informal institutions (social capital) on
entrepreneurship, this trend shifts attention away from the interactions of institutions.
However, we know that institutions interact in different ways and provide different

9

Even though scholars are not unanimous about its exact definition and/or conceptualization, most of
them agree that social capital includes both structural and attitudinal components (Hooghe 2008). The
definition of social capital used in this research comprises the horizontal and vertical dimensions of social
capital implied in Putnam’s (1995) work. The horizontal dimension refers to the networks and associations
that “enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.” The vertical
dimension refers to “social connections and the attendant norms and trust”. It “links agents in asymmetric
relations of hierarchy and dependence” (Putnam 1993, 173). Extensive discussion about social capital is
found in Baum and Ziersch 2003; Bordieu 1983; Coleman 1990; and Grootaert, van Bastelaer, and World
Bank 2001.
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outcomes (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).10 Similarly, previous literature has unveiled
different combinations of institutions that matter for economic performance (e.g.,
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Williamson and Kerekes 2008). The emergence
of institutional interaction in shaping people’s behavior suggests that it is possible to
explain the distribution of entrepreneurship through the institutional interaction theory
even though the subject is relatively less well studied. Most existing studies in this trend
are theoretical or anecdotal, and look at one aspect of the institutional interactions such as
the substitutive roles of informal institutions only.11 This perspective claims that informal
institutions are just as important as the formal institutions by substituting the weak formal
institutions in shaping people’s actions (North 1990).
The findings about the independent/individual effects of entry regulation and
social capital on entrepreneurship, coupled with the current findings (even though
limited) about the effects of institutional mix on entrepreneurship, provide some insights
that the interplay of institutions may determine the distribution of entrepreneurship in the

10

According to their theory, the informal institutions drive the interactions, which constitute the
foundation of their typology of informal institutions: complementary, accommodating, competing, and
substitutive. Informal institutions are complementary to formal institutions when they coexist with effective
formal institutions and the outcomes converge. Informal institutions play significant roles in enforcing the
formal rule of the game in this scenario. Informal institutions are accommodating the formal institutions
when they coexist with effective formal institutions but both institutions diverge. In this case informal
institutions “create incentives to behave in ways that alter the substantive effects of formal rules, but
without directly violating them” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 729). This is the “‘second best’ strategy for
actors who do not like the outcomes generated by the formal rules but are unable to change or openly break
those rules” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 729). Informal institutions are competing when they co-exist with
ineffective formal institutions and the outcomes diverge. Informal institutions structure incentives that are
incompatible with the formal ones. It means that “to follow one rule, actors must violate another” (Helmke
and Levitsky 2004, 729). Informal institutions are substitutive when formal institutions are ineffective but
the outcomes converge. Informal institutions replace the ineffective formal institution and “achieve what
formal institutions were designed, but failed, to achieve” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 729).
11
Peng (2003) and Ahlstrom and Cook (2005) argue that in developing countries, where formal
institutions are weak, personal relations as informal institutions substitute for the formal ones when
commercial and professional norms are not well established. The study of the growth of Tanzanian firm
sector shows that informal institutions have substitutive role for formal ones by rendering business relations
more predictable (Eeckhout 2006, 13).
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formal and informal sector. Treating the formal and informal institutions separately might
not be sufficient to explain this issue, especially when the literature acknowledged that a
good combination of formal and informal rules ensures successful economic outcomes
(e.g., Boettke et al. 2008; Williamson 2009). It is then necessary to add the roles and
effects of the interactions of the formal and informal institutions because the interactions
of the two institutions affect the levels of transaction costs that the entrepreneurs have to
pay, thus influencing their decision to enter the formal or the informal sector. From this
perspective, the institutional interactions approach allows us to understand the fitness
between the two institutions, or lack thereof, as well as to find out the mechanism of the
rules in use that influence the outcomes.
1.4. Thesis
Formal and informal institutions matter for entrepreneurship. The distribution of
entrepreneurship between the formal and informal sector rests upon the ability of the
institutions to create an appropriate framework that can provide the least transaction costs
to allow entrepreneurs to pursue their goals. Entrepreneurs are strategic and choose the
framework that provides the least transaction costs, which allow them to generate higher
profits from their investments and achieve maximum utility (Kirzner 1973). For that
purpose, I shall propose the following theses.
Thesis for the individual effects of institutions: Formal and informal institutions
independently affect entrepreneurship when each institution can provide the best solution
to allow entrepreneurs to reach their goals. Entrepreneur evaluates the transaction costs
and chooses between the sector (formal vs. informal) that provides the highest benefits.

11
Thesis for the effects of the institutional interactions: The existence of
institutional compatibility is crucial for the interplay of formal and informal institutions.
Institutional interaction only matters when it can provide the best solutions to socioeconomic interactions and coordination. If the entry regulation controls an entrepreneur’s
decision to enter the formal or informal market, social capital facilitates the decision.
According to this perspective, the outcomes of institutional mix are influenced by the
relative strength of each institution. This argument deviates from Helmke and Levitsky’s
(2004, 2006) position that informal institutions drive the interactions. The stronger the
institution is, the higher will be its ability to drive the mechanism of the interactions and
to determine the interactions’ outcomes. In this context, stronger institutions are those
that can provide the least transaction-costs and highest rewards. The synergy of the
interactions will determine whether an entrepreneur will either choose to enter the formal
or informal sector or not to engage in any entrepreneurial activity at all. Entrepreneurs are
strategic in their decision, which is influenced by the outcomes of the interactions of
entry regulation and social capital.
1.5. Research Design
1.5.1. Hypotheses
This research has four hypotheses that can be grouped into two categories. The
first category consists of Hypotheses 1 and 2 (individual model), and explores the direct
and independent relationship between formal institutions measured by entry regulation
and informal institutions measured by social capital on entrepreneurship. The second
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category includes Hypotheses 3 and 4 (interaction model), and investigates the effect of
the interactions of formal institutions and informal institutions on entrepreneurship.
Entry regulation is one of the transaction costs that entrepreneurs have to
assimilate when starting a firm. Simplified or low-cost regulation has a direct and indirect
effect on entrepreneurship creation in the formal sector. The direct effect is that it reduces
transaction costs in firm creation (e.g., Djankov 2009; Klapper et al. 2007; Klapper,
Laeven, and Rajan, 2006). The indirect effect is that simplified regulation reinforces the
importance and the benefits of operating in the formal sector. Entrepreneurs that are in
the formal sector have easier access to government support such as financing,
information, training, etc. (Djankov et al. 2008; Kenyon 2007a, 2007b; Klapper, Laeven,
and Rajan, 2006). Entrepreneurs look for opportunities. As strategic actors, they evaluate
the overall costs and benefits in engaging entrepreneurial activities. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
H1: Formal institution measured by entry regulation is negatively related to formal
entrepreneurship.
Social capital provides cooperative solutions to problems of collective choice. It
enables collective action to manage a common resource effectively (Krishna and Uphoff
1999; Uphoff 1990). It provides quick fix to investment problems by reducing the overall
transaction costs of running a business: strong social network and mutual trust facilitate
people’s access to resources related to business transactions, such as lending and
borrowing money, information sharing, product development, etc. (UN Human
Settlements Programme 2003). Similarly, social capital has a self-enforcement
mechanism that promotes cooperation because of the existence of mutual trust within the
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social network. People who choose to enter the informal market have to rely on trust and
social network because business transactions are characterized by the dealings with
anonymous actors. However, they may not be able to rely strongly on formal institutions
to enforce their dealings because they have failed to comply with legal requirements.
Exchange within the informal market has then to depend on mutual trust, strong ties
within the social network, and interdependence among the members of the social
network. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Informal institution measured by social capital is positively related to
informal entrepreneurship.
The effect of institutions on economic activities does not depend solely upon
formal or informal institutions. The combination or the interaction of the two institutions
provide an institutional mix that shapes the actors’ behavior. The interaction is influenced
by the relative strength of each institution. A country’s institutional mix will determine
the prevalence of entrepreneurship in the formal market or informal market.
When the interactions of social capital and entry regulation contribute to the
reduction of transaction costs from formalization, entrepreneurship in the formal market
should be high. The presence of high levels of mutual trust (Miguel 2003; Castiglione,
Van Deth, and Wolleb 2008), supported by effective cooperation from social capital
(Fukuyama 1999), sustained by the access to resources through networking (e.g., Aldrich
and Zimmer 1986; Granovetter 1985, 1992; Jenssen 2001), and mixed with efficient
bureaucracy, hence lower level of entry regulations (Djankov 2009; Klapper et al. 2007),
can reduce the overall costs of business transactions (Cersosimo and Nistico 2008).
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From a different perspective, in the environment where social capital is low, the
presence of low entry regulation becomes an incentive to enter on the formal sector. The
low cost of and the benefits from formalization outweigh the absence of tangible benefits
from social capital. All of the above become incentives to formalize the business. Lower
transaction costs in business formalization influence decision to enter the formal market
(Nelson and De Bruijn 2005). In other words, the existence of low transaction costs
coupled with the desire to receive the benefits of formality can increase the motivation to
enter the formal market. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: The relationship between social capital on formal entrepreneurship depends
on the conditional effects of entry regulation on the institutional mix. I expect
this relationship to be negative as the formal institution influences the
interaction.
When the interactions of entry regulation and social capital make it harder and
more costly for entrepreneurs to formalize their business, entrepreneurs might choose to
practice in the informal market. Excessive regulations, which increase the level of
transaction costs of formalization, may be an incentive to practice in the informal sector
(Djankov 2009; Djankov et al. 2002; World Bank 2005). Informal entrepreneurship can
provide investment opportunities (Yanagihara 1997) in spite of its limitations because it
offers some benefits such as the feeling of accomplishment and personal satisfaction
(Sullivan and Miller 1996), evasion from rules and regulations costs (Kaplan, Piedra, and
Seira 2007; Spiro 1997), and source of income (USAID 2005). The presence of high
social capital complicates the problem of formalization due to the high level of entry
regulation because it can offer solutions that allow an individual to pursue his/her
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entrepreneurship goal outside the formal market. Those who do not want or cannot
comply with formal regulations may get support from their social network to start their
business. Some people also might not simply care about getting formalized because they
have a strong support system from their social network. As a consequence, the informal
sector may be filled with enterprising individuals linked by social network and tied by
mutual trust (Yanagihara 1997, 79). All of the above arguments lead to the following
hypothesis:
H4: The relationship between entry regulation and informal entrepreneurship
depends on the conditional effects of social capital on the institutional mix. I
expect this relationship to be positive as it is driven by the strength of the
informal institution.
1.5.2. Data Description
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship
Two categories of datasets will be used to measure entrepreneurship due to the
absence of single and universal dataset about entrepreneurship in the formal and informal
sector. The two categories are (1) the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey for the
formal entrepreneurship, and (2) the Multiple-Indicators-Multiple-Causes by Schneider
and Buehn (2009) index for the informal entrepreneurship.
Formal Entrepreneurship Measure. The World Bank Group Entrepreneurship
Survey dataset provides information about formal business formation in developed and
developing countries under a legal form of LLC establishment only (World Bank Group
Entrepreneurship Survey 2008). The use of the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship
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Survey is beneficial to this research because it provides higher level of comparability
across countries by considering the different legal economic systems in constructing the
index.12 The World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey has been used to explain
barriers to entrepreneurship (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2004) and different firm
formations across countries (Klapper et al. 2007).
Informal Entrepreneurship Measures. The use of proxy measure is common
and necessary to capture business formation in the informal sector due to the difficulty in
getting data about the informal sector.13 This research will use the indirect estimation
methods of informal sector called MIMIC approach developed by Schneider and Buehn
(2009) as a proxy measure of informal sector for 120 countries.14 The Schneider and
Buehn Index (SBI)15 consists of two parts: the causal variables such as the burden on
direct and indirect taxation, burden of regulations, and tax morality; and the indicator
variables such as development of monetary indicators, labor market, and production
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The main source of the data is national business registries or alternative sources such as statistical
agencies, tax and labor agencies, chambers of commerce, and private vendors. It is collected through
telephone interviews, email/fax correspondences with business registries in over 120 countries. The dataset
contains data on the year-end stock of total registered firms and new firms registered in form of LLC. It has
more data for developed countries than the developing countries.
13
Different approaches have been proposed to measure the size of the informal economy; all of them
have strengths and weaknesses and are likely to understate its true size (La Porta and Shleifer 2008). Three
main categories of informal sector measures have been proposed in the literature (Krakowski 2005):
indirect estimation methods (e.g., Cagan 1958; Giles 1999; Tanzi 1983; Schneider and Buehn 2008;
Schneider 2002), direct estimation methods (e.g., Feinstein 1999; Maligalig and Guerrero 2008), and the
perceptions of informed economic agents (e.g., Salai-i-Martin 2004, 487).
14
The indirect estimation methods of the informal sector is one of the widely used as proxy measure of
informal sector. They rely on the comparison of various sources using different data sources and statistical
models. They are based on the residual balance technique which consists in choosing a specific definition
of the informal sector from which the size of the sector can be inferred (Charmes 2006): empirical
investigation based on electricity consumption (e.g., Lizzeri 1979; Portes 1996), currency demand approach
(e.g., Cagan 1958; Tanzi 1983), and the MIMIC—Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes (e.g., Schneider and
Buehn 2008; Schneider 2000; Giles 1999). Even though this approach is based on strong assumptions and
lacks accuracy, it still provides the global scope of the informal sector (non-observed economy) and is the
most widely used approach for estimating the extent of the hidden economy (Krakowski 2005).
15
MIMIC approach, its development and weaknesses: Bajada and Schneider (2005), Schneider and
Enste (2000, 2002) and Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Schneider (2004), and Kazemier (2005).
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market. Even though this measure of informal economy is only as good as the model that
supports it (La Porta and Shleifer 2008), it has been used by different scholars to study
the informal sector and economic activities especially in the developing countries (e.g.,
La Porta and Shleifer 2008; Krakowski 2005; Ihrig and Moe 2000).
Independent Variables
This study has three independent variables: formal institutions, informal
institutions, and institutional mix.
Formal Institutions: Entry Regulations. This research uses the “number of
procedures required to start a new business,” which is one of the index in entry regulation
as a measure of formal institutions.16 The data are retrieved from the World Bank Doing
Business Indicator, which provides annual consistent cross-country data on 10 specific
aspects of a country’s regulatory framework.17 The number of procedures consists of the
total of official requirements for an entrepreneur to obtain a business license (Djankov et
al. 2002). The number of procedures required to start a new business index is a better
measure of entry regulations compared with the three other indices for different reasons.
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Entry regulation is a combination of four indices that pertain to business start-up requirement: the
number of procedures required to start a new business; the number of days required to start a new business;
the cost of starting a new business as a percentage of the economy's income per capita (e.g., all official fees
and fees for legal or professional services, etc.); and the paid-in minimum capital required to start a new
business that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration. The entry
regulation variable is widely used to study entrepreneurship and business start-up (e.g., Djankov 2009;
Dreher and Gassebner 2007; Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2006, etc.). Even though the accuracy of the data
depends on the types and quality of the source of information, it attempts to provide objectives, quantifiable
measures of institutional and administrative barriers to business start-up. The dataset is widely used for
indicators that benchmark the quality of the business environment across countries.
17
The following assumptions were used to make the data comparable across countries. The company is
a limited company, i.e., a corporation, domestically owned by five individuals, none of whom is a legal
entity. The completion of the procedures was done without intermediaries unless required by law. The
company has at least 10 and up to 50 employees, which are all national, one month after the
commencement of operations. It operates in the country’s most populous city. It has a start-up capital of 10
times income per capita at the end of the starting year, paid in cash.
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Enterprises have to go through this process only once. It is compulsory and is more likely
difficult to avoid or skip because of its legal ramifications. Meeting the requirements will
provide the benefits from formalizing the business such as legal status, access to business
services, finance or government procurement, which can increase the chances for
productivity gains and growth (De Sa 2005). For that reason, entry procedure is the first
obstacle that an entrepreneur faces in starting a business (World Bank 2007).
Informal Institutions: Social Capital. This research uses social capital as a
measure of informal institutions. It is defined as a set of social structure (network) and
attitude (values) that provides social cohesion, which in turn affect people’s actions. The
norms of networking, cooperation, and trust allow people to access power and gain
resources that are instrumental in decision-making and shaping people’s actions, which
affect economic activities (e.g., Seragelding and Grootaert 2000; Aaltio, Kyrö, and
Sundin 2008).
Social scientists are not unanimous about the best indicator of social capital
because of its structural and cultural aspects and the ambiguity of the concepts, and the
number of different types of norms or conventions that characterize social capital (Van
Deth 2008, 152).18 For that purpose, I will construct a theoretical framework of Social
Capital Index for Entrepreneurship Growth based on the two forms of social capital, as
suggested in the literature, that influence economic activities, development, and
economic growth (e.g., Grootaert, van Bastelaer, and World Bank 2002; Zak and Knack
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The existing measures of social capital have flaws because of the problem of separating the source,
form, and consequences (Adam and Roncevic 2003; Sobels, Curtis, and Lockie, 2001). It is difficult and
impossible to measure social capital directly. As a consequence Collier (2002) suggests that for empirical
purposes the use of proxy indicators for social capital is necessary. The choice of the indicator depends on
the concept to be analyzed and the construct associated with it (Narayan and Cassidy 1999, 2001; Collier
2002; Grootaert et al. 2002).
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2001). The two forms of social capital consist of structural and cognitive forms of social
capital.
Social Capital Index for Entrepreneurship Growth =
Structure (Social Network) + Cognitive (Trust)
The interactions of structural and cognitive social capital were suggested to lead
to cooperative behaviors that produce mutual benefits (Grootaert, van Bastelaer, and
World Bank 2002; Uphoff 2000) such as the reduction of transaction costs, which
unlocks the secret of entrepreneurial activities (Jones 2002). The data to construct Social
Capital Index for Entrepreneurship Growth are taken from the World Value Survey
developed by Inglehart and reported in Pippa Norris Data in Spring 200919 for all
countries except the African countries that are taken from the Afrobarometer data.20 The
two surveys use the same questionnaires and scales.
Structural form of social capital indicator: Associational or organization
membership is an appropriate indicator for a structural form of social capital because
social network membership is a significant source of social capital (Glaeser, Laibson, and
Sacerdote 2002; Newton 1997; Skocpol 1999). Associational membership facilitates the
learning and the consolidation of cooperative attitudes and behavior including reciprocity
and trust (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963; Hooghe, 2008; Seligson, 1999). Trust and
cooperation generated by associational membership are relevant to entrepreneurship. The
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Norris, Pippa. Democracy Crossnational Data, Release 3.0 Spring 2009.
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm. Accessed on Oct. 30, 2009
20
The data from Afrobarometer for the 8 Sub-Saharan countries can be accessed at
<http://www.jdsurvey.net/afro/AnalizeSample.jsp>
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indicator for the structural form of social capital represents the percentage of respondents
answering that they belong to at least one association or organization.21
Cognitive form of social capital indicator: The level of generalized trust is the
most used measure of cognitive form of social capital or social capital in general. Trust
represents well the stock of social capital and can capture the different aspects of social
capital effects resulting from networks and cooperation (Baliamoune-Lutz 2009;
Baliamoune-Lutz and Lutz 2004; Knowles 2005). It is also relevant to entrepreneurial
decision especially because of the uncertainty of future outcomes (Dasgupta 1988;
Axelrod 1984; Barber 1983). It is part of the components of the environment that can
determine business start-up. Most studies found that a high level of trust supports norms
and values that promote cooperation; and cooperation, in turn, is more likely to
encourage innovation and productivity (Lee 2004).
Generalized trust index was constructed by computing the percentage of
individuals who responded “Yes” to the following question, a question taken from the
World Value Survey and Afrobarometer: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The
percentage of people who answer “most people can be trusted” (treating the “don’t
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Associational membership question from WVS: “Now I am going to read out a list of voluntary
organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are a member, an active member, an inactive
member or not a member of that type of organization?” The categories include church or religious
organizations, sports or recreational organizations, political parties, art, music, or educational organizations,
labor unions, professional associations, charitable organizations, environmental organizations, and any
other voluntary organizations. Putnam made this approach popular in his 1995 ‘Bowling Alone’ study of
American civic life by computing people’s membership in formal social groups (organization or
associations) to measure social capital. This approach has received many criticisms because of its failure to
measure the changing patterns, growth, and other characteristics of civic engagement (e.g., Pollitt 1999;
Skocpol 1999). Despite these criticisms, the use of people’s associational membership to measure structural
social capital or part of social capital in general is a frequently used method in social capital research
(Sabatini 2009; Stone 2001; Krishna and Shrader 1999).
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know” responses as missing values) represents the cognitive form of social capital
indicator.22
Institutional Mix. The main explanatory variable in this research is the
institutional mix, which measures the interaction between entry regulations and social
capital. Studying the interactions is very significant because the interactions of formal
and informal institutions have a stronger and more defined impact on human behavior
and decisions (Pande and Udry 2006). I will use an interaction term of the number of
procedures required to start a new business and Social Capital Index for Entrepreneurship
Growth using OLS equation to test the effect of the institutional mix on entrepreneurship
(number of procedures required to start a new business*Social Capital Index for
Entrepreneurship Growth). The interaction model is based on the theoretical foundations
that the relative strength of each institution determines the outcomes of the interactions.
Control Variables
The control variables used in this research are levels of economic development,
political stability, and corruption.
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The literature has addressed the limitations and the criticism of the generalized trust question.
Besides being subjective, the index can reveal the indirect impact of the quality of formal institutions
(Narayan 1999). It also conflates the concepts of trust and caution, which reduces the significance of the
trust measure. The existence of high level of generalized trust does not necessarily mean the absence of the
need to be cautious when dealing with other people. In other words, choosing caution and prudence does
not imply the presence of distrust behavior (Miller and Mitamura 2003; Yamagishi, Jin, and Kiyonari 1999;
Yamagashi 1998). Regardless of these limitations, the generalized trust question is still the most widely and
internationally used and the best proxy for cognitive form of social capital, making international
comparison possible (Sabatini 2006). It is probably the only and best indicator of the overall concept
available and is used in the literature to measure cognitive social capital or social capital in general (Stone
2001; Knack and Keefer 1997). Single item measures such as the WVS item, may be more relevant and
meaningful for our understanding of the development of social trust and its relationship with social capital
because trust is trust regarding the context (Stewart-Weeks and Richardson 1998).
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Level of Economic Development (GDP). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at
purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita will be used to measure the level of economic
development and control for economic development because of the relationship between
economic development and entrepreneurship. It provides a relative measure that enables
comparison across the variations of the development levels in the countries covered in
this study. GDP PPP per capita is one of the main sources for qualifying economic
development (Wennekers et al. 2005). The different stages of economic development
lead to different structural transformations of a country, which gradually change
economic activities (Syrquin 1988; Rostow 1960) and influence demand, hence
entrepreneurship. The changes contribute to enterprise creations (Porter, Sachs, and
McArthur 2002) as it increases the demand for goods and services, which stimulates new
business start-ups (Ciccone and Papaioannou 2007; Reynolds et al. 2002; Reynolds,
Storey, and Westhead 1994). They also influence the amount of capital available in an
economy that is crucial for entrepreneurial activities (Reynolds et al. 1994). GDP PPP per
capita has been used as control variable for the study of entrepreneurship or business
start-ups (e.g., Dreher and Gassebner 2007, Wennekers et al. 2005). The GDP PPP per
capita data will be retrieved from the World Development Indicator (WDI).
Political Stability. Political stability is vital for entrepreneurship. Economic
activities require stable environment (Kuznets 1966, 451). Instability increases
uncertainties and the risk of investment failure (Fosu 1992). Stability will allow
entrepreneurs to predict future investments and some level of certainties in economic
activities. I use the “political stability and absence of violence” data from the World Bank
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Governance Indicator23 to measure political stability. The indicator measures “the
perceptions of likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). This factor has highly
detrimental effect on policy continuity and economic environment stability. Stable
business environment, which is an outcome of political stability, fosters business start-up
and growth. Other studies have found a correlation between stability and
entrepreneurship (e.g., Amoros 2009; Klapper et al. 2007).
Control of Corruption. The effect of corruption on entrepreneurship is complex.
On the one hand, the practice of corruption can be an incentive for entrepreneurial
activity as it is beneficial in highly regulated economies (Dreher and Gassebner 2007).
On the other hand, it can be a disincentive as it undermines the foundations of
institutional trust that are needed for the development of entrepreneurial activity (e.g.,
Kaufmann and Kraay 2003; Lambsdorff 2003; Anokhin and Schulze 2009). The World
Bank Governance Index “control of corruption” will be used to measure the corruption
control. It measures “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by
elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). The literature has identified
corruption as both incentive (Dreher and Gassebner 2007) and disincentive to
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The data for the other two control variables (Political Stability and Control of Corruption) will be
taken from the World Bank Governance Indicator (WBGI). The aggregate indicators are based on hundreds
of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from
33 data sources provided by 30 different organizations. They are measured following a normal distribution
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. It ranges between –2.5 to 2.5, with
higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. Even though the WBGI have received some critiques, they
have in recent years become among the most widely-used indicators of governance by policymakers and
academics.
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entrepreneurship (e.g., Kaufmann and Kraay 2003; Lambsdorff 2003; Anokhin and
Schulze 2009).
1.5.3. Methodology
This research has two parts. The first part uses quantitative analysis of data from
48 countries to analyze the global picture of entrepreneurship. The second part is an indepth analysis of the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship using
qualitative case study of Madagascar. The combination of the two methods should
provide better understanding of issue addressed in this dissertation.24
First Stage: Analysis of Global Picture of Institutions and the Distribution of
Entrepreneurship
The dataset used in the first stage covers a three year period from 2004-2006 and
contain information 48 countries due to the lack of comparable cross-country data about
entrepreneurship (dependent variable), business regulation and social capital
(independent variables). The 48 countries (Table 1.1) span a wide range of income levels,
political systems, and geographic locations.25 The data from the 48 countries show the
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Qualitative data will be used when they are available to complement the lack of quantitative data.
The combination of the two methods has been found useful and rewarding in the analysis of political
phenomena (Bennett and Braumoeller 2006; Bennett and George 2001; Greene and Caracelli 1997; Jick
1979; Tarrow 2004). It provides opportunities to exploit the complementary strengths of the two methods
and a more comprehensive understanding of phenomena than using a single method alone (Austvik 2009).
According to Lin and Lotifs (2005), the combination of the two methods is most suited when the state of
knowledge about the research question is intermediate: “when some theoretical expectations have been
established, and/or when the limitations of the data that have been used to explore a question have become
more obvious.” That is the case of this research: the data used to explore the effects of institutional
interactions of entrepreneurship are limited.
25
The sample includes 6 low-income economies, 5 lower middle income economies, 13 upper middle
income economies, and 24 high income economies. It has 4 Asian Pacific countries, 5 Eastern European
and Central Asian countries, 3 Middle East and Northern African countries, 5 Southern and Central Latin
American countries, 7 Sub-Saharan African countries, and 23 OECD countries.
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disparity of the level of entrepreneurship between economies. India and Malawi have the
lowest level of formal entrepreneurship with a density rate of 0.04 per 1,000 population,
whereas the highest is found in New Zealand with an average density rate of 23.54 per
1,000 population. The mean of density rate of formal entrepreneurship of the 48 countries
is 4.59 per 1,000 population with a standard deviation of 4.22 per 1,000 population. The
USA has the lowest level of informal entrepreneurship with 7% of its GDP, whereas
Uganda has the highest level with 48.8% of its GDP. The mean of the informal
entrepreneurship is 20.87% of the GDPs with a standard deviation of 10.20% according
to the Schneider and Buehm Index. The number of procedures required to start a business
between the 48 countries varies between 2 procedures for Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand and 19 for Columbia. The mean for the number of procedures required to start a
business is 7.88 procedures with a standard deviation of 4.25 procedures. The Philippines
have the lowest level of social capital index for entrepreneurship growth with 4.2% of
those who participated in the WVS, whereas Sweden has the highest level with 41.04%.
The mean of the social capital index for entrepreneurship for the 48 countries is 26.78%
with a standard deviation of 9.60%.
The mean of GDP PPP per capita for all 48 countries is $18,153.6 with a standard
deviation of $11,759.86. Malawi has the lowest GDP PPP per capita—$216.00, whereas
Japan has the highest GDP PPP—$40,000.00. The most unstable country is Indonesia
with –1.57 points; whereas the most stable country is Iceland with 1.68 points. The mean
of political stability is 0.53 points with a standard deviation of 0.733 points. Kenya has
the lowest index of control of corruption with –1 score, whereas Finland has the highest
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index with 2.49 score. The mean of control of corruption is 0.97 score with a standard
deviation of 1.10 score.
Table 1.1
Classification of Countries Based on Level of Income26
Low Income
Economies

Lower-Middle
Income Economies

Upper-MiddleIncome Economies

High-Income Economies

Kenya

Egypt, Arab Rep.

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Madagascar

India

Brazil

Belgium

Canada

Malawi

Indonesia

Chile

Croatia

Denmark

Tanzania

Jordan

Colombia

Finland

France

Zambia

Philippines

Dominican Rep.

Germany

Greece

Israel

Hungary

Iceland

Latvia

Ireland

Italy

Mexico

Japan

Korea

Romania

New Zealand

Slovenia

Russian Federation

Spain

Sweden

Singapore

Switzerland

The Netherlands

South Africa

United Kingdom

U.S.A

Uganda

Turkey

Second Stage: Analysis of Institutions and the Distribution of
Entrepreneurship in Madagascar
Deeper analysis about the effect of institutional mix will be conducted in the
second stage of this research using a qualitative case study of Madagascar. The use of
case to explain and study the processes of phenomena is familiar in political science (e.g.,
Bates et al. 1998; Lieberman 2001; Wendt 1998). In spite of its weaknesses, the process-
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The Classification is based on the World Bank Atlas Method. Economies are divided according to
2008 GNI per capita. The groups are: low income, $975 or less; lower middle income, $976 $3,855; upper middle income, $3,856 - $11,905; and high income, $11,906 or more. Source: The World
Bank Country Classification.
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tracing in a case study can establish evidence for causal inferences (George and Bennett
2005) that are crucial in understanding political phenomena and are useful to inform
policy decisions (Crasnow 2009). I believe the causal inferences can be reached by
thorough analysis of the relationship between the formal and informal institutions with
the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sector in Madagascar.
The institutional setting of Madagascar provides a good background to study the
relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship. Madagascar is a low-income
country. 27 According to the Governance Index classification,28 the level of their political
stability and control of corruption falls in the 25-50 percentiles (even though Madagascar
is slightly higher), which is a reflection of relatively low level of political stability and a
significant level of corruption. In spite of these weaknesses, the country has conducted
different institutional reforms to improve business environment and facilitate business
start-ups registration since the mid 1980s. Its informal institutions called fihavanana
(Malagasy social capital), tsiny (reproach), and tody (retribution) play very important
roles in shaping the behavior of the Malagasy people. The intertwined relationship
between these informal institutions captures the principles of social capital and the
concept of reward and sanction mechanisms found in institutions. The entrepreneurship
in Madagascar, which is marked by a dual economy where the informal enterprise co-
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The World Bank country classification is only used to classify the size of the economy, whereas GDP
PPP per capita is used for analysis purposes in this research. The World Bank favors GNI per capita Atlas
measure for accurate measurement of poverty and well-being; it substitutes global prices for local measured
prices, thereby more accurately reflecting the real value of the goods or service in question. Countries that
have GNI per capita of $825 or less was classified low income in 2004, whereas $875 or less in 2005.
Madagascar’s GNI per capita was $300 in 2004 and $310 in 2005.
28
The Governance Index classification has six categories, which moves from low being the worst to
high being the best: 0-10th percentile, 10th-25th percentile, 25th-50th percentile, 50th-75th percentile,
75th-90th percentile, and 90th-100th percentile.
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exists and outnumbers the formal enterprise, has evolved around these formal and
informal institutional contexts.
I use secondary data from different sources such as interview surveys, personal
experience, and archival works to conduct the analysis. The surveys include the World
Bank Enterprise Surveys of Madagascar conducted in 2009 and the interviews of rural
household in the commune of Masindray, Antananarivo conducted by Dr. AndrianjafyAndriamiandrisoa in 2001.29 The Enterprise Surveys are applied to a representative
sample of firms in the non-agricultural economy.30 Other data about entrepreneurship,
entry regulations, fihavanana, tsiny, and tody are obtained from secondary sources
published by the different stakeholders involved in business creation and civil society
promotion.31
The findings from Madagascar have the following implications. They should
provide better clarification about the mechanism behind the relationships between
institutions and entrepreneurship. In addition, it should help us understand the
institutional factors that determine the distribution of entrepreneurship between the

29

The interviews of 147 rural households were collected by Dr. Andrianjafy-Andriamanindrisoa in the
commune of Masindray, Antananarivo, Madagascar in 2001. Survey methodology and scripts can be found
in her book entitled Economie populaire, territoires et développement à Madagascar: Les dimensions
historiques, économique et socio-culturelles du fokonolona. Etude de cas: la commune rurale de
Masindray et la commune urbaine d’Anosibe. 2004. Masindray is a rural commune, 20 miles outside
Antananarivo, capital of Madagascar. It has a population of 1,178 inhabitants. Even though people are
predominantly farmers, most of them have a small business. Examples of small businesses found in the
Masindray are dairy, tannery, trading, construction, restaurant and fast-food, embroidery, carpentry and
woodwork, pottery, etc. 80% of those who were interviewed own a small business as a secondary activity
and additional source of income. 20% of them have a small business as their primary activity and source of
income.
30
Enterprise Surveys collect a wide array of qualitative and quantitative information about the formal
and informal firms through face-to-face interviews with firm managers and owners regarding the business
environment in their countries and the productivity of their firms. The data and detailed information on the
sampling methodology are accessible at www.enterprisesurveys.org.
31
For example, USAID; IMF; OECD; Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture; government
agencies; etc.
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formal and informal sector in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Similar to Madagascar, most
SSA countries have weak formal institutions and dominant informal institutions (e.g.,
Bratton 2007; Hyden 2008; Lyakurwa 2007). They also have a dual economy marked by
the predominance of the informal sectors (e.g., King and McGrath 1999; Sandefur,
Serneels, and Teal 2007).
1.6. Plan of This Dissertation
My dissertation has the following plan. Chapter I served as an introduction of the
dissertation. It situates the research in a global perspective, presents the research
questions, and specifies the contribution of this research. It reviews the literature about
the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship, and identifies what remains
unsolved. It then develops the theses of the research in explaining the effect of individual
institutions (formal and informal) as well as their interaction on entrepreneurship. And
finally, it presents the methodological approaches that I use to conduct the research.
Chapter II will contain the first part of my analysis. It uses quantitative analysis to
explain the effect of the individual institutions and their interactions on entrepreneurship.
It is an attempt to draw a general picture of the distribution of entrepreneurship across the
world. Country level data from 48 countries are used to test both the individual and
interaction effect of institutions on entrepreneurship. The study is relevant to the
understanding of the distribution of entrepreneurship across the world and provides new
perspective about the different dimensions of institutions.
Chapter III presents the second part of my analysis. It extends my discussion by
specifically studying the relationship between institutions and the distribution of
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entrepreneurship in Madagascar. It explains the evolutions of formal institutions (entry
regulations), gives detailed explanations about the informal institutions of fihavanana
(Malagasy social capital), tsiny (reproach), and tody (retribution), and presents an
overview of entrepreneurship in Madagascar. It then shows that the interactions of
institutions provide a better explanation about the distribution of entrepreneurship than
the individual set of institutions.
Chapter IV, which is the last chapter, summarizes the main findings, drawing on
the theoretical arguments and empirical results from the preceding chapters. It presents
the significance of the findings and discusses their theoretical and methodological
implications and indicates potential future research.
1.7. Conclusion
This research explains the factors behind the variation of enterprise creation
across countries by looking at the roles of formal and informal institutions and their
interactions in the distribution of start-up enterprises in the formal and informal sectors. It
tests competing hypotheses about the individual versus mixed effects of formal
institutions (measured by entry regulations) and informal institutions (measured by social
capital) on entrepreneurship. The research uses quantitative analysis of data from 48
countries and a qualitative case study of Madagascar.
The findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses should allow us to be
able to explain the factors behind the differences of entrepreneurship or business start-up
levels across countries and regions, and understand institutional combinations that are
more likely to foster business creation and growth. The case studies of Madagascar
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should improve our understanding about the synergy of institutional interaction and the
state of entrepreneurship not only in Madagascar but in Africa also.

CHAPTER II
DETERMINING THE GLOBAL PICTURE OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DISTRIBUTION
2.1. Introduction
This chapter analyzes the global picture of entrepreneurship. It empirically
addresses the research question of this study using OLS regression models: do individual
institutions (formal and informal institution) or their interactions affect entrepreneurship?
This question can be translated into two main competing approaches about the effect of
institutions on entrepreneurship: (a) effects of individual institutions on formal and
informal entrepreneurship, and (b) effects of institutional mix on formal and informal
entrepreneurship. This chapter is relevant to the understanding of the distribution of
entrepreneurship across the world using the two different estimations (individual
estimation and interaction estimation) and provides better understanding about the
different dimensions of institutions and their effects on entrepreneurship.
2.2. Methodology
2.2.1. Variable Lists
Table 2.1 summarizes the variables used in this dissertation, which have been
described in Chapter I. It has two dependent variables: formal entrepreneurship and
informal entrepreneurship. The proxy measure for the formal entrepreneurship is business

32

Table 2.1
Variable Lists
Variables
Formal
Institutions
Informal
Institutions

Proxy Measures
Entry
Regulations
Social Capital
Index
Trust of other
people

Voluntary
Organization
Membership

Fihavanana
Tsiny
Tody
Formal
Entrepreneurship

Malagasy social
capital
Concept of
reproach or
blame
Concept of
retribution
Business
Registration
Density

Description
Number of procedure without any
intermediaries required to start a business
Combination of structural (voluntary
organization membership) and cognitive
(generalized trust) social capital.
Percentage of people who responded “Yes” to
the question, “Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with
people?” (European Value Study Group and
World Value Survey Association 2006).
Percentage of respondents answering that they
belong to at least one associational category:
church or religious organizations, sports or
recreational organizations, political parties,
etc. (European Value Study Group and World
Value Survey Association 2006).
Malagasy social capital
Reinforcement of fihavanana
Reinforcement of fihavanana
Business Registration Density out of 1,000
people

Unit of
Observation
Number

Scale

Mean

2 to 19
procedures
4.2 to 41.04

8
procedures
26.78

9.60

Percentage of
survey participants

7% to
78.87%

46,45%

21

Percentage of
survey participants

0.3% to 46%

6%

12

0.04 to
23.54/1,000
people

4.10/1,000
people

4.20

Percentage of
survey participants

Standard
Deviation
4.3

Qualitative analysis
of the concept
Qualitative analysis
of the concept
Qualitative analysis
of the concept
Number of newly
registered limited
companies per
1,000 working age
population (those
ages 15-64)
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Variables

Proxy Measures

Informal
Entrepreneurship

Informal Sector
Index by
Schneider,
Buehn, and
Montenegro
(2010)

Level of Economic
Development
Level of Political
Stability

GDP per PPP

Control of
Corruption

Level of Control
of Corruption

Level of Political
Stability Index

Description
“All market-based production of goods and
services that are deliberately concealed from
public authorities to avoid payment of income,
value added or other taxes; to avoid payment
of social security contributions; having to
meet certain legal labor market standards,
such as minimum wages, maximum working
hours, safety standards, etc; and complying
with certain administrative procedures, such
as completing statistical questionnaires or
administrative forms” (Schneider, Buehn, and
Montenegro 2010, 444).
GDP per PPP
Measure of political stability by Governance
Indicator: “The likelihood that the government
will be destabilized or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means, including
politically-motivated violence and terrorism”
(Kaufmann et al. 2010, 4).
Measure of levels of control of corruption by
Governance Indicator: “The extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by
elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al.
2010, 4).

Unit of
Observation
Percentage of
‘official’ GDP

$ value
Range of -2 to 2, 2
being the best

Range of -2 to 2, 2
being the best

Scale

Mean

Standard
Deviation
12.62

7 % to
58.8% of
GDP

23.60% of
GDP

$204 to
$40,000
-1.57 to 1.68

$16,389.89

$12,354

0.43

0.77

-1 to 2

0.93

1.10
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(LLC establishment) registration density out of 1,000 people, whereas the proxy for
informal entrepreneurship is the informal sector index developed by Schneider, Buehn,
and Montenegro (2010). The two independent variables consist of formal institution
measured by the number of procedure required to start a business and informal institution
measured by social capital. It has three control variables: level of economic development,
level of political stability, and level of control of corruption.
2.2.2. Model Specification
I present in this chapter the results from what I called “Simplified Model.”32 It has
the following variables: formal entrepreneurship and informal entrepreneurship as
dependent variables; number of procedure to start a business (proxy measure of formal
institutions) and voluntary organization membership (proxy measure of informal
institution) as independent variables; and political and economic development index (as
control variables).
I chose the variable “voluntary organization membership” as one of the
independent variable because of its fundamental role in the formation of social capital
(Wollenbaek and Selle 2002, 32). I dropped the variable “trust,” which is the other
variable that constitutes the social capital, from this model because it is correlated with

32

I carried out variable selection process (Appendix A) from three different model specifications to
select the best model to conduct the analysis. The three specifications are the “Original Model,”
“Comprehensive Model,” and “Simplified Model.” This approach was motivated by the fact that the
outputs from the original model have multicollinearity problems. Some of the important variables that
matter to entrepreneurship such as informal institutions measured by social capital index, control variables
measured by the level of economic development and political stability are not statistically significant.
Second, there is inconsistency between the hypothesized coefficient sign and the actual sign of some
variables reported in the statistical outputs.
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the formal institutions (procedures to start a business) (Mishler and Rose 2001; Newton
and Norris 2000).
The control variable is an index of economic and political factors that affect
entrepreneurship. The index is a combination of the level of economic development,
political stability, and control of corruption. I used factor analysis to create the index
(e.g., Hamilton 2006; Jack 1971). The rotated factor loading has one factor only, which is
mostly defined by the variable “control of corruption.”
I use bootstrapping regression model to test the hypothesis in the Simplified
Model. Bootstrapping procedures estimate the sampling distribution of a statistic, treating
the sample as population (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, 16). Bootstrap is beneficial
when one relies on limited number of observations, which is the case in this research
(Mooney 1996). This research relies on existing data from 48 countries from 2004 to
2006, which are limited to 90 observations.33 The boostrap estimates and standard errors
in this research are computed using resampling of the residuals with 5 sets of 50
replicates.
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Data sample limitation that leads to the use of small data sample is a common problem in political
studies. Schedler and Mudde (2010) found from their survey of 559 comparative politics articles published
in leading academic journals between 1989 and 2007, that about a quarter of all quantitative studies in
comparative politics use small sample size of 20 to 100 countries. It is one of the characteristics of cross
country comparative politics despite the improvement of cross national data availability and access. Thus,
reliance on available numerical information (“data”) is common in quantitative empirical research
(Schedler and Mudde 2010) even though methodologists advocate the desirability of political science
studies being method driven, theory driven, or problem driven (Shapiro, Smith, and Masoud 2004). As a
consequence, “a significant portion of quantitative research is data-driven. The availability of established
global datasets conditions the type of questions asked, the variables selected, their indicators, and the
techniques of analysis” (Diehl 1992, 334). Even though the use of limited number of observations might
present measurement and general inference challenges, its merits and usefulness are worth considering. It
can provide better understanding of the phenomena to be studied and the results can potentially provide
valuable findings and knowledge (e.g., Bates 1981; Katzenstein 1985; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; and
Laitin 1995).
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2.3. Data Analysis
2.3.1. Relationships Between Formal Institutions and Formal Entrepreneurship
Hypothesis 1 predicted that formal institution measured by entry regulations is
negatively related to formal entrepreneurship. The output from the bootstrap regression
supports this prediction. An inverse relationship exists between formal institutions
measured by entry regulation and formal entrepreneurship. Each additional procedure to
start a business (proxy measure of formal institution), leads to 1.8 decrease in the number
of newly registered limited companies per 1,000 working age population (proxy measure
of formal entrepreneurship) within Inter Quartile Range (IQR) of 25 to 75 percentile34
holding other variables constant. Table 2.2 shows the outputs of the regression results.
Table 2.2
Test of Hypothesis 1
Dependent Variable: Formal Entrepreneurship
Explanatory Variables:

Coefficient

Formal Institutions

–0.30*
(0.16)

Informal Institutions

–0.02
(0.02)

Political and Economic Development Index

1.26**
(0.74)

Constant

6.71*
(1.53)

Adjusted R2-Value

0.31

Notes: *Significant at p<0.05, **Significant at p<0.10. Standard error in parentheses. n = 88.
Estimated obtained from STATA 9.0. Source: The World Bank. The World Value Survey and
Afrobarometer (World Bank 2008a).
34

The Inter Quartile Rage is a robust measure of variability of the independent variables.
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The relationship between the second explanatory variable (informal institutions
measured by voluntary organization membership) and formal entrepreneurship is not
statistically significant. The relationship between the political and economic development
index (control variables) and formal entrepreneurship is statistically significant and
positive. Higher level of economic development, political stability, and control of
corruption combined contribute to higher level of formal entrepreneurship.
2.3.2. Relationship Between Informal Institution and Informal Entrepreneurship
Hypothesis 2 predicted that informal institutions (as measured by voluntary
organization membership) are positively related to informal entrepreneurship. The results
from the bootstrap regression (Table 2.3) support this prediction. The relationship was
statistically significant and positive. In other words, higher level of informal institutions
in form of voluntary organization membership leads to higher level of informal
entrepreneurship. For each percentage increase in voluntary organizational membership,
a 0.36 increase in size of informal entrepreneurship (as a percentage of “official” GDP) is
predicted within IQR of 25 to 75 percentile holding all other variables constant.
The second explanatory variable—formal institutions measured in number of
procedures required to start a new business was not statistically significant. As far as the
index of economic and political control variable, its relationship with informal
entrepreneurship was significant and negative. Lower level of economic development,
political instability, and low level of control of corruption contributes to higher level of
informal entrepreneurship.
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Table 2.3
Test of Hypothesis 2
Dependent Variable: Informal Entrepreneurship
Explanatory Variables:

Coefficient

Informal Institutions

0.18*
(0.06)

Formal Institutions

0.01
(0.21)

Political and Economic Development Index
Constant
Adjusted R2-Value

–10.74*
(1.09)
22.75*
(1.97)
0.31

Notes: *Significant at p<0.05, **Significant at p<0.10. Standard error in parentheses. n = 90.
Estimated obtained from STATA 9.0. Source: The World Bank. The World Value Survey and
Afrobarometer (World Bank 2008a).

2.3.3. Relationship Between Institutional Mix and Formal Entrepreneurship
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the relationship between informal institutions
(measured by voluntary organization membership) and formal entrepreneurship depends
on the conditional effects of formal institution (measured by entry regulation) on
institutional mix. I expect this relationship to be negative as the formal institution
influences the interaction. The result (Table 2.4) does not support this prediction.
Institutional mix is not statistically significant. It does not have any effects on formal
entrepreneurship holding all other variables constant.
In addition, the interaction estimation shows that the effect of informal institutions
measured by voluntary organization membership is not statistically significant. This
finding is similar with the finding from the individual estimation addressed in Hypothesis
1. We can conclude from the individual and interaction estimation that informal
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institution does not determine formal entrepreneurship, according to the sample in this
study.
Table 2.4
Test of Hypothesis 3, Interaction Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: Formal Entrepreneurship
Explanatory Variables:

Coefficient

Institutional Interaction35

–0.01
(0.01)

Informal Institutions

–0.11
(0.07)

Formal Institutions

–0.34*
(0.17)

Political and Economic Development Index

1.16
(0.77)

Constant

7.16*
(1.68)

Adjusted R2-Value

0.35

Notes: *Significant at p<0.05, **Significant at p<0.10. Standard error in parentheses. n = 88.
Estimated obtained from STATA 9.0. Source: The World Bank. The World Value Survey and
Afrobarometer (World Bank 2008a).

The output from the interaction estimation shows that formal institutions (number
of procedures required to start a business) has a significant and negative effect on formal
entrepreneurship like in the individual model (Hypothesis 1). The direction of the
relationship is similar with the model estimation. Fewer procedures required to start a
business leads to higher level of formal entrepreneurship. The relationship between the

35

Institutional mix (interaction of formal and informal institutions)
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political and economic development index (as control variables) and formal institutions is
not statistically significant.
2.3.4. Relationship Between Institutional Mix and Informal Entrepreneurship
The prediction in H4 is that the relationship between formal institutions measured
by the number of procedures to start a business and informal entrepreneurship depends on
the conditional effects of informal institutions measured in voluntary organizational
membership on the institutional mix. I expect this relationship to be positive as it is
driven by the strength of the informal institution. The results (Table 2.5) failed to support
the prediction. Institutional mix is not statistically significant and does not have any
Table 2.5
Test of Hypothesis 4, Interaction Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: Informal Entrepreneurship
Explanatory variables:
Institutional Interaction36
Informal Institutions
Formal Institutions
Political and Economic Development Index
Constant
Adjusted R2-Value

Coefficient
–0.01
(0.02)
0.22
(0.24)
0.01
(0.22)
–10.70*
(1.11)
22.54*
(1.93)
0.78

Notes: *Significant at p<0.05, **Significant at p<0.10. Standard error in parentheses. n = 88.
Estimated obtained from STATA 9.0. Source: The World Bank. The World Value Survey and
Afrobarometer (World Bank 2008a).

36

Institutional mix (interaction of formal and informal institutions)
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effects on informal entrepreneurship holding all other variable constant. It is the same for
the other two explanatory variables. Informal institutions and formal institutions are not
statistically significant.
The political and economic development index (control variables) was found to
be inversely related to informal entrepreneurship. Lower levels of economic
development, political stability, and control of corruption leads to higher rate of informal
entrepreneurship. This is consistent with the previous model estimation and what was
predicted in Hypothesis 2.
2.4. Discussion of the Findings
2.4.1. Research Question and Thesis

This research attempts to explain the factors behind the variation of cross-country
enterprise creation by answering whether formal and informal institutions individually or
their interactions affect entrepreneurship. I presented two theses based on competing
hypotheses about the role of institutions on the distribution of entrepreneurship between
the formal and informal sector. The first thesis argues that each set of institution
determines the distribution of enterprise because each institution can provide the best
solution to allow entrepreneurs to reach their goals. The second thesis posits that
institutional interaction matters for the distribution of entrepreneurship. According to this
perspective, the outcomes of institutional mix are influenced by the relative strength of
each institution.
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2.4.2. Findings and Discussion
Two major conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the sample I used in
this research. First, it shows that each set of institutions determines the distribution of
entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sector. The findings did not support the
theses about the roles of institutional interactions in the distribution of entrepreneurship.
Second, economic and political conditions together contribute to the growth of businesses
in the formal and informal sector.
Individual Effect of Formal and Informal Institutions on Formal and
Informal Entrepreneurship
The results from the estimations show that each set of institution has a definitive
and independent role in determining the distribution of entrepreneurship between the
formal and informal sector. Formal institutions influence those who enter the formal
sector and informal institutions influence those who enter the informal sector.
Formal Institution and Formal Entrepreneurship. The findings from the test
of Hypotheses 1 and 3 demonstrate that formal institutions measured by the number of
procedures to register a business negatively affect formal entrepreneurship. Fewer
procedures required to register a new business are associated with higher level of
entrepreneurship in the formal market.37 Using the bootstrap regression outputs from H1,
I found that for each decrease in the number of procedure to start a business, we expect to
see 1.8 increase in the number of newly registered limited companies per 1,000 working

37

This conclusion is supported by the outputs from the three models (Appendix B) showed that there
was a negative significant relationship between formal institutions and formal entrepreneurship. This
finding is similar for the individual model (H1) as well as the interaction model (H3). The output is almost
identical in the individual model (H1) when we look at the coefficient values of the three models.
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age population (those ages 15-64) (proxy measure of formal entrepreneurship) within
IQR of 25 to 75 percentile holding other variables constant. The inverse relation between
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formal institution and formal entrepreneurship is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1
Relationship Between Formal Institutions and Formal Entrepreneurship38
Table 2.6 classifies the relationship between the formal institutions and the formal
entrepreneurship based on the median39 of the formal entrepreneurship (3.26 density per
1000 persons) and the number of procedure to start a business (8 procedures) into four
categories.
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The graph uses one observation only per country for the graph clarity purposes.
Median is used for formal entrepreneurship and formal institutions as the central tendency measure
because the samples are significantly skewed.
39
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Table 2.6
Country Classification Based on Formal Entrepreneurship
and Formal Institution Relationship
Number of Procedures
Median: 8 procedures
High
Category 1
Spain, Mexico
High
Formal
Entrepreneurship
Category 3

Median: 3.26
density per 1000
population
Low

Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Germany, Greece,
India, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Philippines, Russian Federation,
Slovenia, South Africa,
Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda

Low
Category 2
Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark , Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, New
Zealand, Romania, Singapore,
Sweden, The Netherlands, UK,
USA
Category 4
Finland, France, Switzerland,
Zambia

The first category only has two countries: Spain and Mexico. It is a combination
of formal entrepreneurship that has equal value of or greater value than the median of
business entry density rate out of 1,000 population and formal institution that has equal
value of or greater value than the median of the number of procedure to start a business.
The second category has a total of 15 countries, most of which are high income
economies. This category includes countries with a high levels of formal
entrepreneurship (those with a business entry density rate greater than or equal to the
median value) and low formal institutional barriers (those countries where the number of
procedures to start a business less than or equal to the median).
The third category consists of the 21 countries in the data set that have low levels
of formal entrepreneurship and high formal institutional barriers.
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The countries in the fourth category are those that have formal entrepreneurship
equal or lower than the median of business entry density rate out of 1,000 populations
and have formal institution equal of or lower than the median of number of business to
start a business. These countries are Finland, France, Switzerland, and Zambia.
The finding that entry regulations can affect entrepreneurship is consistent with
the literature (van Stel, Storey, and Thurik 2006). Regulations, even though necessary,
can become an obstacle to entrepreneurship and its formalization, especially when they
are burdensome. Through regulations, government can ease or complicate economic
activities (Heckelman 2000). Excessive regulations in the different stages of business
activities can become a disincentive to entrepreneurship because of the cost of
uncertainties that accompany them (Miller and Holmes 2009). Burdensome entry
regulations prevent entrepreneurship and the entry to the formal market (e.g., Kaplan,
Piedra, and Seira 2007; Bruhn 2008; Klapper, Leaven, and Rajan 2006; Scarpetta et al.
2002).
Informal Institutions and Informal Entrepreneurship. I found from the
analysis that informal institutions—volunteer organization membership is positively
related to informal entrepreneurship. It determines business formation in the informal
sector.40 The higher the level of voluntary organization membership, the higher the level
of informal entrepreneurship. For each percentage increase in voluntary organizational
membership, a 0.36 increase in size of informal entrepreneurship (as a percentage of

40

The relationship of informal institution with the informal entrepreneurship is mixed in the other two
models. For the Original Model, the Social Capital Index is significant but negative at the ten percent level
in the individual estimation. It was not significant in the interaction model. For the individual hypothesis
for the Comprehensive Model, trust is not statistically significant but voluntary organization membership is
and the relationship is positive at the ten percent level. The two variables are not statistically significant in
the interaction model.
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“official” GDP) is predicted within IQR of 25 to 75 percentile holding all other variables
constant. The positive linear relationship between the two variables is evident from
Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2
Relationship Between Informal Institutions and Informal Entrepreneurship
The second category includes countries that have high informal entrepreneurship
but low voluntary organization membership. It has a total of 17 countries, in which most
of them are middle income economies except Belgium, Greece, and Spain. The third
category consists of countries that have low informal entrepreneurship but high voluntary
organizational membership. It has 10 countries which are all high-income economies.
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The countries in the fourth category are those that have low informal entrepreneurship
and low voluntary organization membership. It has 6 high-income economies.
The 48 countries in the sample can be grouped into four categories (Table 2.7)
using the median of informal entrepreneurship and informal institution as central
tendency measures.41 The first category consists of countries that have high informal
entrepreneurship and high voluntary organization membership. It has 7 countries, which
are all Sub Saharan African countries.
Table 2.7
Country Classification Based on the Relationship Between Informal Institution
and the Level of Voluntary Organization Membership
Voluntary Organization Membership
Median: 1.5% of the interview participants
High
Low
Category 1
Category 2
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
High Zambia
Informal
Entrepreneurship
Median: 19.3%
of GDP

Category 3

Low

Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, New Zealand,
Singapore, Sweden, The
Netherlands, USA

Argentina, Brazil, Chile
Colombia, Greece, Hungary,
India, Italy, Latvia, Mexico,
Philippines, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovenia, Spain,
Turkey
Category 4
France, Germany, Ireland, Japan,
Switzerland, U.K.

We can draw two important conclusions from the findings about the positive
relationship between the informal institutions in form of social capital and informal
41

Median is used as the central tendency measure because the sample is significantly skewed.
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entrepreneurship. First it echoes the previous research that informal institutions can be a
contributing factor to the growth of informal sector. These studies suggest that informal
institutions shape and govern entrepreneurship through their informational, enforcement,
incentive, substitutive, and competing or dominant roles. They consist of “collection of
social norms, conventions, and moral values that constrain individuals and organizations
in pursuit of their goals…and coordinate peoples’ expectations of one another” (Raiser
2001, 218, 19). By providing information to firms, informal institutions can reduce
transactions costs of undertaking economic, political, and social initiatives (Proctor 2007,
132). They play significant roles in providing “economic efficiency by reducing
transaction costs in the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty” (Raiser 2001,
219).42
According to Table 2.7 and 2.8, all of the countries that exhibit high level of
informal institutions and high level of informal entrepreneurship are Sub-Saharan
countries: Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
When we look at the control variables, these countries, except South Africa, have some
similarities. They have low level of economic development and are classified as low
income economies by the World Bank. They are relatively unstable with level of political
stability below zero according to the Governance Index data. Also, they have high level
of corruption, with level of corruption control below zero according to the Governance

42

However, in spite of the low cost of the informal institutions, they have a limited scope, volume, and
a low “calculability” (Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001) in reducing transaction costs and enforcing economic
exchange (Proctor 2007, 132).
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Index. The similarities in the characteristics of these countries suggest that informal
institutions help fill the gap created by economic and political uncertainty.
Table 2.8
List of Countries that Have High Informal Entrepreneurship
and High Social Capital
Country

Kenya 2004
Kenya 2005
Madagascar 2004
Madagascar 2005
Malawi 2004
Malawi 2005
South Africa 2004
South Africa 2005
Tanzania 2004
Tanzania 2005
Uganda 2004
Uganda 2005
Zambia 2004
Zambia 2005

Informal
Sector (%
of GDP)

GDP
PPP
($)

Political
Stability
Index43

34.10
34.40
40.70
40.10
40.60
40.70
28.60
28.80
58.70
58.80
48.80
49.10
50.80
50.80

428
442
286
255
204
216
3,300
3,429
311
324
263
263
350
339

–1.05
–1.19
0.10
0.10
–0.10
0.09
–0.22
–0.06
–0.44
–0.38
–1.42
–1.40
–0.10
–0.10

Control of
Corruption
Index44
–0.87
–1.00
–0.12
–0.12
–0.76
–0.80
0.44
0.55
–0.67
–0.70
–0.74
–0.80
–0.80
–0.86

Organizational
Membership (%
of participants)
43
43
24
24
46
46
1.7
1.7
34
34
37
37
36
36

Source: World Bank Database and Afrobarometer

The second conclusion that can be drawn related to the role of informal
institutions is that informal institutions, specifically voluntary organizations contribute to
the creation and growth of enterprise in the informal sector. From this perspective,
informal institutions pave the way to the informal sector. The pre-existing status of
informal institutions in form of social network or voluntary organization membership

43

The composite measures of Political Stability are generated by an Unobserved Components Model.
They are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard deviation of one, and running
from approximately –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance.
44
Idem.
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becomes a catalyst to the process of business creation. As a structural element of social
capital, voluntary organization membership contributes to the growth of informal sector
by facilitating the development of trust and the building of a society that values
cooperation between individuals (inside or outside the associations) with different
purposes (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Hooghe, 2008;
Seligson, 1999; Stolle and Rochon, 1998). The trust and cooperation generated by
associational membership are important for entrepreneurship. Because interaction among
voluntary association members can create the conditions that facilitate information
sharing, knowledge exchange, and collaboration that might lead to business creation in
the informal sector.
Effect of Institutional Mix on Formal and Informal Entrepreneurship
The interaction of formal institution (number of procedures) with informal
institutions (voluntary organization membership) does not have any effect on
entrepreneurship either in the formal or informal sector according to the findings from the
analysis. The outputs failed to support H3 (relationship between institutional mix with
formal entrepreneurship) and H4 (relationship between institutional mix with informal
entrepreneurship) because they are not statistically significant. The interactions of entry
regulations based on the number of procedures required to start a new business with
social capital based on voluntary organization membership do not determine business
creation. The findings from this study suggest that even though informal and formal
institutions matter for entrepreneurship, their effect is defined by the unique characteristic
of each set of institution but not their interactions. Formal institutions negatively affect

52
formal entrepreneurship, whereas, informal institution positively affect informal
entrepreneurship.
Assessment of the Relationship Between the Control Variables Index and
Entrepreneurship
The results support the thesis that the control variable index determines the
distribution of entrepreneurship between the formal and informal sector. It is positively
related with the formal entrepreneurship but negatively related with the informal
entrepreneurship. The finding is consistent both in the individual and interaction
estimation. The control variable index is a combination of the level of economic
development (GDP per PPP), level of political stability, and level of control of
corruption.
Composite Index of Control Variables and Formal Entrepreneurship. The
higher the level of economic development, political stability, and control of corruption
combined, the higher the level of entrepreneurship in the formal sector. Figure 2.3 shows
the linear positive relationship between formal entrepreneurship and the control variables
combined. According to the trends in the graph, the countries that have high level of
economic development, political stability, and control of corruption have higher level of
formal business and vice versa. For example: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Ireland, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, The Netherlands, etc.
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Figure 2.3
Relationship Between Formal Entrepreneurship and Political
and Economic Control Variables
Composite Index of Control Variables and Informal Entrepreneurship.
Inverse relationship exists between the political and economic development index (as
control variables) with the business formation in the informal sector. The combination of
low economic development, lack of political stability, and low level of corruption control
contribute to high level of entrepreneurship in the informal sector. Figure 2.4 shows the
linear negative relationship between informal entrepreneurship and the control variables
combined. We can see from this graph that countries that have low level of economic
development, political stability, and control of corruption have high level of informal
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sector and vice versa, for example, Colombia, Chile, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, and
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Figure 2.4
Relationship Between Informal Entrepreneurship and
Political and Economic Control Variables
2.5. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the global picture of entrepreneurship.
It looked at the role of formal and informal institutions and their interactions on business
formation and creation in the formal and informal market using data from 48 countries
within the period of 2004-2006. It explained the significant differences between
entrepreneurship across countries or regions.
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The findings from this study support the thesis that institutions play important
roles in the formation of enterprise in the formal and informal sector by controlling the
political and economic variables constant. It supported the first thesis that formal and
informal institutions individually and independently affect entrepreneurship. However, it
failed to support the second thesis that institutional mix determines the distribution of
entrepreneurship between the formal and informal market. Even though the findings from
this research support the trends in the literature that institutions matter for
entrepreneurship, it goes further to demonstrate that each set of institutions (formal vs.
informal) is unique and designs different path for entrepreneurship. It is the characteristic
and strength of formal and informal institutions that determine the business formation in
the formal market vs. informal market but not their interactions.
Formal institution is inversely related to formal entrepreneurship but does not
have any relationship with informal entrepreneurship. Less cumbersome business entry
procedures encourage entry into formal entrepreneurship. Informal institution is
positively related to informal entrepreneurship but is not related to formal
entrepreneurship. Social capital measured by voluntary organization facilitates the
practice in the informal entrepreneurship. Higher level of social capital contributes to the
growth of informal entrepreneurship. The findings from the effect of formal and informal
institutions on entrepreneurship implies that only the formal institutions determine
business creation and entry to the formal sector; whereas informal institutions determine
the entry to the informal sector holding the level of economic development, political
stability, and control of corruption combined (Control variable index) constant.

CHAPTER III
INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION
OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE FORMAL AND
INFORMAL SECTOR IN MADAGASCAR
3.1. Introduction
This chapter uses Madagascar (Figure 3.1) as a case study to analyze the roles of
institutions on entrepreneurship. It uses qualitative data to test competing hypotheses
about the relationship between formal and informal institutions with the distribution of
entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sector. The first two hypotheses posit that
formal and informal institutions have a direct and independent effect on the distribution
of entrepreneurship between the formal and informal sector. It means that a formal
institution (number of procedures to start a business) is negatively related to formal
entrepreneurship, whereas informal institution (social capital) is positively related to
informal entrepreneurship. The last two hypotheses contend that institutional interactions
determine entrepreneurship distributions. The relationship of institutional interaction with
the distribution of entrepreneurship depends on the conditional effect of each set of
institutions (formal vs. informal) on the institutional mix.
This chapter is organized in such a way that it will answer the question about the
roles of individual institutions vs. institutional interactions on entrepreneurship
distribution between the formal and informal sector. Part one briefly discusses the main
arguments presented in this chapter. Part two presents an overview of entrepreneurship in
Madagascar. Part three gives a thorough analysis of the formal institutions (number of
56
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procedures required to start a business) and informal institutions of fihavanana (social
capital) in Madagascar. Part four tests the hypotheses and discusses the findings. Part five
concludes the chapter.

Figure 3.1
Map of Madagascar (CIA World Factbook 2007)
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3.2. Institutional Determinants of Entrepreneurship Distribution in Madagascar
Madagascar is characterized by a dual economy where the informal enterprise coexists and outnumbers the formal enterprise. The Malagasy government has conducted
different reforms to improve business environment and facilitate business formalization
since the mid 1980s. More aggressive reforms were conducted since 2003 and have
classified Madagascar as one of the best reformers (World Bank 2006a). Even though the
successive reforms have ameliorated the business environment and business
formalization, a pertinent question still remains: what explains the distribution of
entrepreneurship in Madagascar, which is marked by the prevalence of informal
entrepreneurship?
The answer to this question requires an analysis of the business entry regulations45
as formal institution and fihavanana (Malagasy social capital) as informal institution in
Madagascar. Business start-up regulations reflect the trajectory of the country’s political
and economic development, whereas the norms and the values of interpersonal
relationship established by fihavanana govern people’s daily interactions. The two
institutions have an enduring interaction because the Malagasy people always act
according to the unwritten rules from fihavanana.
From this perspective, I will show in this chapter that even though each set of
institutions determines the distribution of entrepreneurship between the formal and
informal sector, the institutional interaction argument provides a better explanation about
this effect. It implies that the quantitative data analysis might not be the best approach to
45

Business regulations and procedures to start a business are interchangeably used in this chapter
because of their association (e.g., Djankov et al. 2002; Djankov 2009; Desai et al. 2003; Klapper, Leaven,
and Rajan 2006; De Soto 1990).
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capture the institutional interaction mechanism that constrains entrepreneurs and the civil
servants who enforce business entry regulations. I believe that the interactions of formal
institutions measured by business start-up regulations with the informal institutions
measured by fihavanana determine the distribution of entrepreneurship in Madagascar. It
is the imbalance between the strength of each set of institutions that drives the interaction
mechanism. The lack of enforcement mechanism in the formal institutions allows the
informal institutions to influence the outcomes of the interactions. Formal institution is
weak because it does not have any enforcement mechanism, whereas the informal
institution is strong because of its unwritten rules of enforcement. The failure of
bureaucracy, which handles business entry procedures increases the transaction cost of
formalization, which in turn filters the entrance to the formal market and at the same time
promotes entrepreneurship in the informal market due to the resources available through
the interpersonal values emanating from fihavanana.
3.3. Overview of Entrepreneurship in Madagascar
According to the most recent census published by the National Institute of
Statistics of Madagascar (INSTAT) in 2005, the Malagasy formal enterprise comprises
211,315 registered businesses. The businesses are limited in scope as regards their
activities, and highly concentrated regionally in the province of Antananarivo, capital of
Madagascar, and in terms of size, with monopolies or oligopolies in many sectors.46
Almost 63% (62.8%) of them are implanted in Antananarivo, 11.1% in Toamasina (East
coast of Madagascar), and 9.4% in Antsiranana (North coast of Madagascar) (INSTAT

46

This assessment was made by the World Bank in its different reports (1995, 1997, and 2008).

60
2006, 6). These enterprises are organized into three types (Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry 2007). The first type is a large scale of modern national and foreign
enterprise (e.g., Export Processing Zone). It provides employment to skilled labor, has
access to the global market, and constitutes the export sector. The second is a relatively
average size national owned enterprise. It serves the domestic market but may be
involved in export activities and constitutes the intermediary sector. The third is a
multitude of micro and small enterprises, which is a source of employment for unskilled
labor and relies on traditional technology. It constitutes the traditional sector and
dominates the domestic market by providing services or by producing basic goods such
as food, clothing, housing, etc.
Providing precise quantitative estimation of the informal enterprise is impossible
because of the nature of the informal sector. However, it has been estimated to represent
a significant percentage of business activities in the country. In terms of employment, the
informal sector dominates the labor market, which provides employment for 64.5% of the
1.2 million wage laborers or 95% of the 8.3 million working age adults considering the
total workforce, including non-wage workers in Madagascar (Stifel et al. 2007, vii). The
informal enterprises consist of small-scale and indigenous enterprise. They operate
mostly in farm activities in rural areas, whereas non-farm activities take place in urban
areas in general.
3.4. Formal Institution—Business Start-Up Regulations
In Madagascar, business entry regulations are defined by the procedures that an
entrepreneur has to comply with to formally register a business. The procedures consist in
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of any interaction of the entrepreneur with external parties such as government agencies,
lawyers, auditors and notaries (World Bank 2005). They can be put into three categories:
(1) pre-registration (e.g., name verification or reservation, notarization); (2) registration
in the economy’s largest business city; and (3) post-registration (e.g., social security
registration, company seal).47 Even though the procedures seem to be few, they have been
reported to be unfriendly to business creation (e.g., World Bank 1999; Shah et al. 2005).
Table 3.1 shows the significant reforms that the government has made to improve
business registration procedures. The reforms have cut the number of procedures from 15
in 2004 to 2 in 2011 and have reduced the number of days from 67 in 2004 to 7 in 2011.
It is true that these reforms have facilitated business formalization; however, entry
regulations still constitute a constraint to business creation in the formal sector (e.g.,
World Bank 1995, 1999; Shah et al. 2005).
Table 3.1
Historical Data—Business Registration Regulations in Madagascar48
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Procedures
(number)

15

13

11

10

5

5

2

2

Time (days)

67

44

38

21

7

7

7

7

47

This research uses the category established by The World Bank Doing Business Indicator to allow
comparison between countries. Extensive information about this methodology can be found at
www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/starting-a-business#time
48
Historical data was retrieved from The World Bank Doing Business Indicator Report for
Madagascar. It has other indicators that are not included in this table: cost (% of income per capita) and
paid-in minimum capital (% of income per capita). Source: www.doingbusiness.org/CustomQuery/madagascar. Accessed March 23, 2011.
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Entry regulations in Madagascar are cumbersome, not streamlined, and costly
because of the numerous forms, signatures, and stamps that are required for each
procedure. Bureaucracy is slow and “difficult at best, an impossibly complicated waste of
time and money at worst” (Cole 2010, 149). These issues are supported by the reports
from different international organizations that assess government and public service
effectiveness. Malagasy Government Effectiveness Index has been always within the
25th–50th percentile since 1996, which is a reflection of a relatively low level of
government effectiveness according to The World Bank Governance Index.49 The
country’s quality of public administration is moderately weak, with an average rating of
3.4 during the period of 2005-2009 based on the Country Performance and Institutional
Assessment (CPIA) report for public sector management and institutions cluster measures
in 2010.50
The lack of bureaucratic effectiveness becomes a major obstacle to investment
because cumbersome bureaucracy begets burdensome entry regulations, which become
an obstacle to business creation in the formal sector. 51 To understand this issue, one

49

The Governance Index classification has six categories, which moves from low being the worst to
high being the best: 0-10th percentile, 10th-25th percentile, 25th-50th percentile, 50th-75th percentile,
75th-90th percentile, and 90th-100th percentile. The Country Data Report for Madagascar during the period
of 1996-2009 can be found at www.info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c139.pdf. Accessed March 22,
2011.
50
The public sector management and institutions cluster includes property rights and rule-based
governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of
public administration, and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector (1=low to
6=high). The following are broad representations of the various rating categories: “1” Very weak for 2
years or more; “2” Weak; “3" Moderately weak; “4” Moderately strong; “5” Strong; and “6” Very strong
for 3 years or more (African Development Bank Group 2008). The ratings for Madagascar can be found at
the World dataBank, World Development Indicators (WDI) & Global Development Finance (GDF).
www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.PUBS.XQ/countries?display=default. Accessed March 22,
2011.
51
U.S. Department of State 2011 Investment Climate Statement reports that “Excessive complexities
and inconsistently applied bureaucratic regulations are an impediment to investment and can be a breeding
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needs to look at the relationship between business entry regulations and the Malagasy
bureaucratic and administrative systems52 since entry regulations reflect the bureaucratic
and administrative systems of the country (e.g., Djankov, 2009; Djankov et al. 2002;
Klapper et al. 2004, 2007). The excessive nature of the Malagasy bureaucracy has its
roots from the post-independent political and structural legacies of the country. It is a
political base to ensure a long term of governance for the party in power and an
instrument of rules to exclude the oppositions.
3.4.1. Structural Legacies
The excessive nature of the Malagasy bureaucracy, which handles business
formalization, can be explained through the structural legacies of the public service. The
Malagasy bureaucracy and public administration are highly centralized both
administratively and fiscally in the capital city, where the government is located. They
employ “about 0.8 percent of the country’s population or 146,000 agents in 2004 and
only 0.75 civil servants per 100 inhabitants work in rural areas—as compared to 2 per
inhabitants in urban centers” (Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007, 4). The central
administration is not efficient because of its composition, centralization, and management
(e.g., African Development Fund 2005; IMF 1999). Around 60% of total staff is support
staff; while the technical level—which typically forms the backbone of a good civil
service—accounts for only 30% (Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007, 4).
Administrative decision-making is extremely hierarchical and procedural frameworks are

ground for corrupt practices. The lack of transparency in government regulatory decisions has generated
complaints from current investors.”
52
Some scholars have argued that entry regulations reflect the bureaucratic and administrative systems
of the country (e.g., Djankov 2009; Djankov et al. 2002; Klapper et al. 2004, 2007, 2008).
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complex, non-transparent, and corrupt (Dahl 1999; Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan
2007).
The centralization of the administration started first under the Merina Kingdom. It
was sustained under French colonial rule and carried over during the post-independence
era. To some extent, this structure disfranchises and penalizes those who live in the
provinces because most of the major decisions must come from the central government.
This is still true even after the decentralization and de-concentration of the
administration.53 The autonomous provinces lack administrative initiative, coordination,
economic integration, political power, and resources (African Development Fund 2005,
ii).
Malagasy bureaucracy is weak even though the central administration appears
stronger than those that are in the regions. The general causes of the weakness include
weak institutional capabilities; ill-defined rules; lack of frames of reference and criteria
for individuals and society; a steady decline in oversight and regulation mechanisms; the
mismatch between structures and goals; and inadequate, incoherent and obsolete laws and
regulations (UNDP 2001, 2).
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Madagascar’s territorial administration is based on the principles of deconcentration and of
decentralization. The deconcentrated administration is at the level of Autonomous Provinces (6), Regions
(22) where the deconcentrated services of a few ministries (health and agriculture) are now present,
districts (116) as well as administrative subdivisions. The decentralized administration comprises three
levels: Autonomous Provinces, Regions and Councils (1557 including 45 urban councils). Autonomous
Provinces are currently managed by officials appointed by the Central authority (Special Delegations).
Regions, in their capacity as decentralized territorial entities, have legal personality and financial
autonomy. Currently, during a transitional phase, the members of the Regional Executive (4 persons)
managed by Heads of Region are officials appointed by Decree issued in Council of Ministers. A Regional
Committee, the decision-making organ of the Region composed, in equal number, of members of
Parliament of the Region, representatives of Mayors as well as representatives of economic operators and
civil society, is set up in each Region. Councils, which are the grass-roots entity, also have legal personality
and financial authority” (African Development Fund 2005, 5, 6).
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The bureaucratic weakness is reflected in the lack of public service ethics and the
absence of enforcement and accountability system that govern public servant. Even
though public service standards have existed for many years, they are very broad, are not
accessible to everybody, and remain as policy reference only.54 Bureaucratic failure, poor
performances, incompetence, and unethical practices such as absenteeism and disregard
of working hours go unpunished because of the absence of effective performance
appraisal mechanism (UNDP 2001b). In general, public agents are free from their
actions, except in the case of fraud and misappropriation of the public purse where some
indictments and convictions of civil servants have been delivered (UNDP 2001a, 46).
However, the indictments and convictions are usually used to attack political opponents.
In addition, civil service users’ complaints are not usually taken in consideration or do
not really have any weight even though public complaints procedures do exist. They are
put on file and are less likely to be addressed.
The absence of enforcement and accountability system and the dysfunction in the
Malagasy public service influence civil servants’ attitude and morale in a negative way,
and detrimentally affect their service output. They promote illicit personal enrichment,
family or ethnic favoritism, political patronage, and especially poor customer service.
These issues affect motivation and performance of civil servants who handle business
registration. The situation penalizes entrepreneurs and discourages investment (World
Bank 2008b).
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They came from three different sources: the Constitution, Government circular, and public servant
regulations. The 1992 Constitution addresses the requirement of integrity and political neutrality of the
public service. The circular of the Prime Minister in September 13, 1990 defines public relations in the
public service. The regulations for public services concern the disciplinary regime and codes. These
regulations have undergone many reforms since the late 90s. The reforms led to the adoption of Code of
Ethics of Civil Servants in the late 1990s (UNDP 2001a, 2001b).
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3.4.2. Political Legacies
The formal institutions in Madagascar are improving but still place considerable
limits on development of formal enterprises due to burdensome and unprofessional
bureaucracy. The political legacies of Madagascar play very important roles in creating
this situation as this section demonstrates. The Malagasy bureaucracy inherited the heavy
administration and cumbersome regulations, which characterized the colonial
bureaucratic system (Randrianja and Ellis 2009). The post independence political
legacies of Madagascar can be classified into three epochs: nation-building (1960-1972),
socialism and self-reliance (1972-1982), and economic and political reforms (1983 to
date). The epochs are characterized and defined by the political ideologies that have
determined the economic and political development of the country. Even though the
ideologies adopted by the political leaders of each epoch are different, they share one
similarity when it comes to business entry regulations. The political leaders of each epoch
have used bureaucracy to deliver policies that principally benefit their personal economic
interests and their political base.
The first epoch (1960-1972) was marked by nation-building based on colonial and
capitalist model of production and administrative system inherited from the colonial
power in spite of President Tsiranana’s nationalism conviction (Marcus 2004). The
political structure of the First Republic was characterized by the dominance of a single
party (Parti Social Démocrate—PSD). The bureaucracy of the First Republic was built on
a top-heavy administration that was subsidized by France and heavy taxation (Thompson
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and Adloff 1965).55 The adoption of the colonial administrative system was not
surprising because most of the colonial institutions and establishments were maintained
due to Tsiranana’s political choice to protect the French interests and adopt a proWestern and anticommunist course (e.g., Allen 1995; Thompson and Adloff 1965; Covell
1987). In addition, the leaders during that period only knew the cumbersome colonial
government due to their education.56 As a consequence, the Malagasy bureaucratic
system, which administered business creation and promotion, reflected the mixed
outgrowth of interdependent cultures, that is the French in whose country a significant
number of new civil servants took their training, the colonial administrative and
bureaucratic system, and the PSD party. The pro-government and PSD actors such as
landowners and farmers with capital, the small urban functionaries, wage earners and
entrepreneurs were the principal beneficiaries of the system (Chaigneau 1981).
The legacy of burdensome bureaucracy was not really changed after the fall of
Tsiranana even though the new government led by General Ramanantsoa embarked in
“tabula rasa” approach to completely wipe out the neo-colonial regime. This second
approach (1972-1982) was centered on the policy of Malgachization, which had three
components (Cole 2010, 39): replacement of the “foreign ways” (fomba vazaha) to the
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The French government provided $70 million annually in direct assistance to mainly keep the
bureaucratic and import-export machinery functioning (Allen 1995, 58).
56
The first president of the new nation and the Malagasy civil servants received their training in France
or from the public administration school that Galliéni established in Antananarivo (Pryor 1990). In
addition, the agreements and conventions of Franco-Malagasy cooperation gave France access to manage
and provide certain services for the new Republic. One of these services was the higher education sectors,
where government officers and civil servants were trained. Only selected and small group of people coming
from the inner circle or the new elites benefited from the higher education system and become very
influential and powerful civil servants and administrators. They took advantage of state institutions to
benefit from the system. “Landholders and a new bourgeoisie created by party rule dominated access to
higher education and civil service jobs, public contracts, and social prestige. The PSD and its key personnel
fused political and administrative roles into one function, one aim, a single identity” (Allen 1995, 52).
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Malagasy ways (fomba gasy); replacement of all foreigners who held official positions by
Malagasy nationals; and adoption of the Malagasy language as the official language for
teaching and administration to replace the French language. These reforms did not
alleviate bureaucratic load but rather created new layers of administration on top of the
previous ones.
The Second Republic inherited the heavy bureaucracy but permeated it with the
socialist ideology mixed with the celebration of local and nationalist culture (Cole 2010).
The socialist regime of Ratsiraka “requires bureaucrats to undergo indoctrination sessions
on the tenets of the Revolutionary Charter, and urges them to join AREMA party”
(Covell 1987, 114). The socialist revolution brought with it the creation of different
bureaucratic posts that reward close friends and relatives, who did not have any expertise
in public service (De Gaudusson 1976). As a consequence, new layers of bureaucratic
procedures where created to sustain and justify the creation of the new positions. This
situation explains the lengths of procedures and the numerous signatures, stamps, and
notarizations necessary for any administrative work in Madagascar. Each position is
equivalent to a signature to legitimize its relevance and show the power that comes with
it. The lack of expertise of the bureaucrats who were recruited through personal
affiliation created tensions among civil servants, between them and bureaucratic users,
and is a fertile soil for corruption and extortion (Covell 1987).
The challenge of heavy and centralized administration was carried over to the
third epoch (1983 to date), which began with the birth of the Third Republic in 1992.
This epoch was characterized by the different reforms to liberalize the economy through
significant private sector investment and entrepreneurship promotion. However, in spite
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of these efforts, the Malagasy civil service still suffered from a number of organizational
and regulatory weaknesses, as well as lack of motivation (IMF 1999). The civil service is
highly bureaucratized where rules, red-tape and personal status are more important than
service and contribution (Kabell 2006, 24). Bureaucratic procedures remain burdensome
because the successive governments adopted the same practice in creating new positions
and adding new layers for their supporters with a view to getting personal and collective
enrichment. As a consequence, the level of corruption perception in Madagascar for the
last nine years (Table 3.2) was never passed the 3.4 index. Corruption due to conflict of
interests exist almost in all sectors of public services.
Table 3.2
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI)57
Year

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

CPI

1.7

0.6

3.1

3.8

3.1

3.2

3.4

3.0

2.6

Effort to reduce bureaucratic burden have been conducted by the successive
governments during the Third Republic. The Center for Facilitation of Enterprise
Creation (CFEC) for private investors was created to house the key services involved in
the processing of administrative and business entry procedures in the late 1990s. These
reforms were necessary because one of the government’s strategies was to follow the
IMF recommendations to privatize state-owned enterprises and promote private

57

Ten (10) point being the least corrupt and 0 point being the most corrupt.
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009. Accessed March 15, 2011.
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investment, and the plan to launch Enterprise Processing Zone promotion as part of its
global effort to promote entrepreneurship.
With the goal to establish a strong economy with free market approach, President
Ravalomanana embarked in aggressive reforms to reduce bureaucratic burdens and
modernize the business environment. His government created the Guichet Unique des
Investissements et de Development des Entreprises (GUIDE) through decree No.
2003/938 to facilitate and alleviate the formal administrative procedures. The GUIDE and
the Enterprise Creation Facilitation Center have largely contributed to reducing the
number of procedures to start a business from 15 in 2004 to 11 in 2006 and the number of
days to set up a business from 67 in 2004 and 38 in 2006 (World Bank 2006b). The
government pursued its goal to improve the conditions of the development of private
sector and created the Economic Development Board of Madagascar (EDBM)58 to ensure
investment promotion in Madagascar and serve as a one-stop administrative center for
business creation procedures. EDBM’s duties encompass all aspects of business activities
from the start-up, to management, and closure.
The gradual ease of business entry regulation due to different successive reforms
since 1996 has significantly improved the business environment, thus encourages
business formalization in Madagascar. For example, the number of registered industries
in the Enterprise Processing Zones has found an increase of 34 times since its inception
in 1990 until 2004 as reported in Table 3.3. The entry was reduced in 2002 because of the
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This new institution is the outcome of a merging of two previous institutions that used to promote
private sector: the second Project for the Private Sector Development [Projet de Développement du Secteur
Privé (PDSP-2), namely the Committee for Supporting the Steering of Enterprises [Comité d’Appui au
Pilotage de la Relance de l’Entreprise (CAPE)] and the One Stop Shop for Investments and Enterprise
Development [Guichet Unique des Investissements et de Développement des Entreprises (GUIDE)].
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6 months of political crisis in Madagascar. However, the registration has picked up in
2003.
Table 3.3
Historical Data of EPZs Number in Madagascar
Year

1
9
9
0

1
9
9
1

1
9
9
2

Registered
EPZs

12

20

73

1
9
9
3

1
9
9
4

1
9
9
5

1
9
9
6

1
9
9
7

1
9
9
8

1
9
9
9

2
0
0
0

2
0
0
1

2
0
0
2

2
0
0
3

2
0
0
4

106 138 177 209 241 259 267 283 335 355 395 405

Source: Republique de Madagascar (2004)

An important increase also was found in the domestic business. The report about
the total of new registered enterprise in Madagascar shows an increase of 45% since the
establishment of GUIDE in 2003 until 2008 as we see in Table 3.4. The statistics about
the business entry regulations and the entry to the formal sector confirm the hypothesis
that formal institution measured by entry regulation is inversely related to formal
entrepreneurship. The number of business entering the formal sector has increased as the
government pursues different reforms to facilitate business registration.
3.5. Informal Institutions—Fihavanana and Tsiny and Tody
I demonstrated in the previous chapter that the weaknesses of formal institutions
have contributed to the low entry to the formal sector in Madagascar in spite of the
successive reforms made by government. However, putting the blame on the formal
institutions alone does not provide the full picture of the distribution of entrepreneurship
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Table 3.4
Comparison of Change in Business Entry Regulations, EPZ’s Registration,
and Overall Business Registration in Madagascar (2004-2009)
Year

Business Entry Regulations
Procedures (number)

Overall Business
Created

Time (day)

2004

15

67

817

2005

13

44

882

2006

11

38

1,028

2007

10

21

1,050

2008

5

7

1,183

2009

5

7

724

Source: World Bank (2009a) Doing Business in Madagascar (2004-2009); World Bank
Entrepreneurship Data (2010)

in Madagascar. This section shows that the informal institutions also play significant
roles in this issue.
The informal institution concerning fihavanana enfolds the concept of social
capital as social network and norms of reciprocity and trust. It shapes Malagasy’s actions
and behavior because of the norms and values of mutual help and support. These norms
and values are enforced by the informal institution of tsiny (guilt, reproach) and tody
(punishment, retribution). The intertwined relationship between fihavanana and tsiny and
tody are important for entrepreneurship because they construct norms and values that
shape people’s behavior in their interactions with others. They generate collective
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expectations such as value introjections, reciprocity transactions, bounded solidarity, and
enforceable trust that affect individual economic behavior.59
3.5.1. Fihavanana Institutions
The notion of social capital in Madagascar refers to the principle of fihavanana.
Fihavanana is one of the main foundations of all aspects of human relations of Malagasy
people. It underlines the intertwined relations between the Malagasy based on kinship of
any form, which can be genealogical that is traceable through family kin or artificial that
is constructed through social network (Dahl 1995). It implies a close tie between
individuals and a belonging to a large family; the family is the Malagasy people. It is “the
outermost protective social layer for the individual. It includes any and all persons to
whom an individual could trace a real, or an imagined, kinship link” (Dahl 1995, 104).
The sense of belonging rests on the principles of reciprocity, which generates social
expectations such as tolerance, social harmony, mutual respect, mutual help, solidarity,
relationship, and trust. These values of social networks, bonding similar people and
bridging between diverse people, with norms of reciprocity are called social capital
(Dekker and Uslaner 2001; Uslaner 2001).
Fihavanana Malagasy encloses the two elements of social capital: structural
(social network) and attitudinal (principle of trust) social capital. It determines the scope
of social network that people belong to, and defines the boundary of trust between them.

59

Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993, 1325) suggest that social capital determines economic actions
through the operating principle of the following elements: value interjection (socialization into
consensually established belief), reciprocity exchanges (norm of reciprocity in face-to-face interaction),
bounded solidarity (situational reactive sentiments), and enforceable trust (particularistic rewards and
sanctions linked to group membership).
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It is the glue that unifies the Malagasy people amidst their diversity as reflected in many
proverbs such as: “Tsihy be lambanana ny ambanin’ny lanitra,” which means “all who
live under the sky are woven together like one big mat.”60 As an informal institution, the
values and norms associated with fihavanana have great influence on individuals’ and
groups’ behavior, decisions, and actions. On the one hand, the strong ties between people
affect collective actions as they foster mutual dependence, trust, and reciprocity (FritzVietta, Röttger, and Stoll-Kleemann 2009). On the other hand the traditional norms and
strong personal relationships and solidarity are often used in favor of elites, which might
lead to favoritism, corruption, bribery and abuse of power (e.g., Dahal and Adhikari
2008).
Structural Element of Fihavanana
The structural element of fihavanana refers to the Malagasy social network,
which is delimited by the two aspects of havana: “genealogical havana” and
“cooperative/artificial havana” (Dahl 1995, 1999; Ramaroson 1997). It implies
interactions within a system of horizontal linkage among individuals (Fritz-Vietta,
Röttger, and Stoll-Kleemann 2009; Sirven 2006). Even though hierarchy exists between
the two aspects of Malagasy social networks, both of them imply the same meaning of
fihavanana, i.e. the bond and unity between people within their network. The foundation
of social network is fihavanana, which makes Malagasy social capital rich and broad
because of its inclusive characters.
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Proverb translation was taken from Malagasy Proverbs by MadaCamp.com.
www.madacamp.com/Malagasy_proverbs. Accessed May 9, 2011
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Genealogical Havana. The genealogical havana implies natural kinship and
blood relatives. It is a personal relationship between people based on filiations and
siblingship (Bloch 1971, 1986; Ramaroson 1997; Randriambololona 1990). It reflects the
personal network of Malagasy that is composed largely of members of their kindred,
which people who share a common usually ancestry entertain (Kottak 1980). It applies to
real kin, ancestors or people who share one or more ancestors with ego (Kottak 1980,
183). Not only do people’s genealogical relations connect and attach them to each other,
but they also determine the social network that they belong to and its size.61 Having kin
and being with kin are important because not only does it provide security, but it also
ensures access to different resources. According to genealogical havana, kins are
expected or obligated to help one another; and this cooperation is one of the expectations
found in social network. For that purpose, the genealogical havana, as a social network,
has endless moral value such as “the duty of mutual love and help, cooperation, and
family solidarity” (Bloch 1971, 59). These values influence people’s behavior during
their interactions with others, and allow them to have access to different resources.
Cooperative Havana. The cooperative havana is a non-genealogical havana or
artificial havana. They are havana because of the value of the practical cooperation that
they can provide (e.g., Bloch 1971, 1986; Kottak 1980; Ramaroson 1997;
Randriambololona 1990). Cooperation and coordination for mutual benefits are features
of structural social capital based on social network (Fukuyama 1995). Havana can be
neighbors who do not have any lineage relationship, or a distant relative i.e. a remote
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“The ties that bind descendants are thought to be the strongest of any interpersonal relationship”
(Keenan 1974, 61).
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kinship formed through marriage. The cooperative havana also is extended to the
community through the notion of fokon’olona. Fokon’olona refers to the political and
administrative village council. “It is primiraly a local-level organization that regulates
village affairs” (Kottak 1980, 179). People in the same community have permanent
relationship by living together in the same area. They are mpihavana or linked together
because they form community kinship and share resources together. Cooperation is
expected from the fokon’olona in the same community because of the greater good of
fokontany (village or community) and the same resource that they are sharing together
(e.g., Bloch 1971; Condominas 1962). Here, kinship, common residence, and cooperation
mean the same thing.
As a social network, the cooperative havana is composed of the people whom a
Malagasy regularly interacts with in his/her community. The necessity of cooperation
among the people who live in the same community emphasizes the relevance of this type
of social network. From this perspective, “cooperation is thought of less as an economic
service than as a demonstration of a moral link” (Bloch 1971, 98). This type of social
network is called in the literature cooperative social network, which arises from repeated
interactions between pairs or groups of agents (Mobius et al. 2004).
Fihavanana as social network here means “the intimate and close relations
between members of a family, extended to a deeper friendship between people of the
same community and lastly with people of the same land. In other words, fihavanana is
not limited to one’s immediate relatives” (Gastineau 2006, 3). It goes beyond the family
lineage because the Malagasy people believe that God has assigned them to share life
together in the island of Madagascar. From this perspective, “all havana are equal—they
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all share the same substance equally, they are thought of as being consubstantial” (Bloch
1986, 138). Thus, the ideal found in the Malagasy social network reinforces the values of
inclusiveness and reciprocity.
Independently of the category of fihavanana, genealogical or not, mutual
assistance among villagers is something altogether natural, from the most casual help up
to some kind of organized cooperation. While visiting, or simply on a way to some
destination, it would be good form for a person to lend a helpful hand to a neighbor
whom he or she catches right in the midst of his/her daily activity. The gesture, meant to
express the visitor’s “commiseration,” and to prove the long-standing love that unites the
villagers, fosters friendship, and reinforces the bonds that tie them together. This
assistance can last only a few minutes, or half a day, or even a day (if the visitor is free
for the day). But no matter how long it takes, the helper is happy to have fulfilled his
sacred duty in behalf of his/her neighbor, and the one being helped cannot be otherwise
but highly appreciative. A profusion of kind, thankful words and well-wishes will express
the latter’s gratitude and appreciation.
But cooperation can also be carried out in a half-casual and half-organized
manner. In the northern part of Madagascar, for example, the fandriaka is an agreement
between two or more friends to help one another in their work, mostly a seasonal activity
(like rice farming) where timing is of the essence, and in which synergy is understood to
bring about more efficient result. It consists in working together on an alternate basis in
each of the contractors’ fields for the same amount of time. The amount of time agreed
on can be one day, or two days, or a week, or more. Suppose X and Y have contracted a
fandriaka. Today X and Y will work in X’s field. Tomorrow, both of them will work
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together in Y’s field. Or, this week, they will work together in Y’s field. Next week, they
will work together in X’s field... In any case, the host will always take care of the food
part of the deal. But that does not prevent X or Y to bring along “something to eat,” to
help or to please his/her host, because fihavanana is based on trust and courtesy and
selfless love and altruism, not on rigid, hermetic clauses for fear of being cheated by the
other.
The lampogno is another form of country-life cooperation. It consists in a oneafternoon bout of field work, to which the host invites his male friends or neighbors. The
host does not feed his guests, but provides them with betsa, or laimadio.62 The trick of
the trade consists, for the host, in serving the guests with drinks, while working, with a
well studied balance between generosity and parsimony. Otherwise, either the host will
incur the guests’ remonstrance from being too niggardly about the drinks, or the guests
get drunk before any job at all is done. At the fall of the day, everybody who can goes
home. If not (because they are too drunk), they will spend the night under the roof, or in
the backyard, of their host, himself drunk enough to take care of anybody.
The tamby-rô consists in inviting the whole community, far and near, to a wholeday, vast piece of field-work (for example: rice harvesting on hectares of paddies), during
which one or even two zebus are killed for the guests to eat with rice. It is associated with
the idea of huge feast, with plenty of meat (beef), which is a rare commodity in rural
areas. The name tamby-rô connotes the notion that the community has been enticed, or
tricked, into coming to work by the enticing medium of the meaty feast! Only villagers
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Two kinds of strong homemade beer: the betsa is made of sugar-cane juice, or diluted honey, mixed
with a bitter tree-bark called bilahy, and is left in a container to ferment. The laimadio (the-clean-one) is
made of fermented banana, and has a clean-looking purity, hence its name, but is very high in alcoholic
density.
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who have a certain economic means (big landowners, with tens or hundreds of head of
cattle, etc.) can afford to have a tamby-rô. But undoubtedly, the tamby-rô is a huge
village festivity, and, along with other events, like balls and tsikafara,63 constitutes a
joyful event that gives the villager a huge thrill in his/her otherwise monotonous life.64 In
that capacity, it definitely represents a unifying factor, in addition to its economic
fallouts.
Cognitive Element of Fihavanana
The cognitive element of fihavanana embodies interpersonal trust and establishes
the norms of interactions. Fihavanana and trust are inseparable concepts in the Malagasy
culture. In this respect, mutual trust ensures social harmony and good relationship. The
Malagasy people believe that all havana are trustworthy until the contrary is proven. This
statement stands on the four categories of fihavanana based on the notion of trust. These
four categories are tapaka (kin), namana (acquaintance), havana (distant relative or/and
neighbor), and sakaiza (very close friend) (Rakotoharintsifa 2002; Ramasindraibe
1971).65
Tapaka (kin) is the first category of fihavanana as cognitive social capital. This
type of fihavanana is based on biological ties from marriage and family lineage. The
source of trust from this perspective is the ties or the links that bind those who share the
same blood because they come from the same parents or same origins. The relationship
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Celebration events, in which one or two zebus are immolated.
Inspired from Rakotovao’s (2011) unpublished book called “Iahay: Cahier biographique et
généalogique de la famille Gilima,” p. 47.
65
Extensive explanation of “tapaka sy namana, havana aman-tsakaiza” can be found in the work of
Rakotoharintsifa (2002) and Ramasindraibe (1971).
64
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that led to the existence of the offspring came from the trust between the couples when
building their marriage. This trust is transmitted to their children and descendents through
education, relationship, and socialization (e.g., Bloch 1986; Dahl 1995).
Namana (acquaintance) is fihavanana based on friendship through similarities
(e.g., Rakotoharintsifa 2002; Ramasindraibe 1971). This expression, as a type of
cognitive social capital, is used to identify people who share the same ideas, values,
beliefs, and life style. These people are not related biologically. The sources of trust from
namana are the similarities that the acquaintances have and the issues that unite them.
Namana is dependable because of these reasons. This friendship can be built on selfinterests or altruism. It ends when the similarities or commonalities do not exist anymore
or the issues/things that unite the two entities are dissolved.
Havana (distant relative and/or neighbor) is fihavanana based on neighborhood
(e.g., Rakotoharintsifa 2002; Ramasindraibe 1971). People in this category can be distant
relatives or just neighbors. Everyone sharing the same environment and resources (land,
air, water) is included in this category of fihavanana. Here, the belongingness to the same
environment and resources is the source of trust. The size of havana is then defined by
the proximity between the different individuals that live in the same areas, which share
almost the same resources. Mutual trust and solidarity among those who live in the same
community are expected here.
Sakaiza (very close friend) is a friend by choice based on long-term friendship
(e.g., Rakotoharintsifa 2002; Ramasindraibe 1971). It is another type of friendship. On
the one hand namana is a friend/acquaintance through commonalities or similarities; on
the other hand sakaiza is a friend by choice based on long-term friendship. Sakaiza (close
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friend) is higher or stronger than namana (acquaintance) because it is only used for those
who have very close relationship. The source of trust in sakaiza comes from the ability of
a person to choose his/her close friend and the length of their relationship. This type of
fihavanana is expected to last forever; otherwise it is similar as namana or acquaintance.
As explained above, trust as a cognitive element of social capital is embedded in
the Malagasy social capital. It is reflected in the four categories of fihavanana: “tapaka
(kin) sy namana (acquaintance), havana (distant relative or/and neighbor) aman-tsakaiza
(very close friend).” Interpersonal trust based on the four-fold of fihavanana treats all
people on the same level because of the ties or links that bond them together either
through blood (tapaka—kin), acquaintance by commonalities (namana—acquaintance),
relative by geographic location (havana—distant relative or/and neighbor), and close
friendship by choice and lasting relationship (sakaiza—close friend) (e.g.,
Rakotoharintsifa 2002; Ramasindraibe 1971).
However, this trust is not blind because of the following reasons. Malagasy
always strive for social harmony. They believe in universal order of justice, which
demands an equal return or tsiny (blame) and tody (punishment) institutions (will be
addressed later). Their awareness and avoidance of imperfections cause them to be very
cautious them to be very cautious with their actions. From this perspective, trust built in
fihavanana does not represent personal traits or characteristics, but it shows the type of
expectations from relationships. More clearly, Wilson (1992, 101,102) explains it this
way:
People who are havana to each other are not, by that definition, good or bad.
Havana are people one can most likely trust (or mistrust) not because they are by
definition trustworthy but because one either knows them directly, in that they
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may be understood to be like the people one knows as kin. This is not the same as
assuming that havana are “good.”
Fihavanana and Corporate Community
I have demonstrated that the two elements of social capital as structural (social
network) and attitudinal (principle of trust) social capital are embedded in the fihavanana
Malagasy. The implication of this concept is that fihavanana determines the scope of
social network that a person belongs to, and defines the boundary of trust between people
and solidifies it. From this perspective, fihavanana, as informal institutions, shape the
Malagasy’s actions because of the rights and obligations associated with it.
Fihavanana provides the rights to corporate equality because of its different
dimensions that combine everybody as one unit of havana. The concept of the “one unit,”
in spite of the different dimensions of fihavanana, is expressed in the following proverb:
“Ny olombelona hoatry ny ladim-boatavo, ka raha fotorana, iray ihany” or, “Men are
like the creeping stem of the pumpkin, and if traced, are found to be one.”66 The
belonging to social network, which can be both restrictive through genealogical kinship
and extensive through artificial kinship, makes all havana equal. Also, the corporate
equality is reflected in the trust that springs from the four different categories of havana.
Trust is solidified because everybody belongs, at least, to one of the categories of
fihavanana (kin, friend/acquaintance, relatives, and close friends) in any shape or form.
Fihavanana requires the Malagasy people to meet the obligation of solidarity and
cooperation. These obligations can be individual and corporate because of the restrictive
(genealogical kinship) and extensive (artificial kinship) scope of fihavanana. Solidarity is
66

English translation, Houlder in: Sibree 1929: nr.11
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expressed through different proverbs such as: Trano atsimo sy avaratra, ka izay tsy
mahalen-kialofana or “Of two houses next to each other, the one that does not leak
provide a shelter for all.” Solidarity is “a common property and ultimately a common
obligation” (Spindler 2003, 109). “The acts of solidarity have the sole aim of maintaining
and if possible, increasing life in its double meaning of vital impulse and social
existence” (Raharilalao 1990; Spindler 2003, 109). It is illustrated through individuals’
participation in traditional rites and customs, which strengthen the link within the
community and empower its members. Cooperation is expected from everybody
especially in time of needs, and takes different forms. It is based on a spirit of free giving
and mutual help and the belief that what you do for others will come back to you in
different ways. Cooperation based on fihavanana allows one to “ask money,
recommendations, help, and services from those who are better off. It is not necessary to
pay back unless the other one or his dependents are in trouble” (Dahl 1999, 86).
3.5.2. Tsiny and Tody Institution
The rights to corporate equality and the obligations of solidarity and cooperation,
which are associated with norms of mutual support and mutual trust, are important to
entrepreneurship. The presence of the atmosphere of amity and solidarity is necessary for
sincere cooperation. No transaction is possible without certain amount of cooperation and
certain level of trust between actors. Trust and solidarity are important to secure
transactions. However, the rights and obligations found in fihavanana are insignificant
without any enforcement mechanism, which is reflected in the informal institutions of
tsiny any tody.

84
Tsiny (guilt, blame) and tody (punishment) are other influential informal
institutions in Madagascar. I called them institutions of enforcement because not only do
they influence and moderate people’s behavior, but they have the ability to make people
comply with societal rules, norms, standards, and obligations like what we have found
about fihavanana. They share the reward/punishment mechanism that characterizes
institutions. They have powerful influence in Malagasy people’s thought and actions.
Tsiny and tody have their source from customs and taboos, which define norms of
behavior and actions. Customs are very important because they reflect Malagasy respect
to their ancestors, who were the originators and guardians of customs. These customs
provide norms and frameworks for everyday behavior. They are sources of fady (taboos)
that are “considered commands of the ancestors that must be avoided under peril of
incurring their wrath and inviting calamities” (Nelson et al. 1973). The respect of
customs and taboos are transferred from generations to generations through parents’
education and socialization. There are many taboos for everything, and it is impossible to
know all of them; therefore tsiny and tody are omnipresent in the Malagasy thought and
actions.
Tsiny
Tsiny means the guilt, blame, and offense that come from the neglect or disrespect
of ancestors, taboos, customs, and moral law of universe. It is the guilt that a person feels
and receives because of any action of non-conformity to societal rules. The guilt and the
sadness from the transgression are believed to turn into a negative force for the sake of
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justice. Andriamanjato (1957) explains this very well in his thesis of Tsiny in Malagasy
thought:
the tsiny presents itself as blame, the censure that one risks when one fails to
behave in this or that manner, or follow this or that custom. Briefly, if you happen
to forget some of the multiple rules that govern acts and thoughts in their
manifestations, you are subject to tsiny (14)…The tsiny is, on the one hand, an
imperfection of the acting person, and on the other hand the consequence of this
imperfection, the more or less supernatural force that acts to sanction this
imperfection. It is within the person with a blemish and at the same time it goes
beyond the individual that is victim of tsiny, if he tries to accomplish something
when the forces of the universe unite against him (59).67
It expresses a fault that a person makes, or a wrong done to someone. “It carries
with it a burden of guilt that remains with a person, family, community, or other group”
(Rich 2008, 245). Because of the tsiny, people behave in a certain way to avoid any
offense to somebody, especially to the one who intends to do good. The blame may
manifest in tangible or intangible forms such as failure in business, sanctions, tragic
accidents, family conflict, illness even sudden death to the extreme, or sometimes a
feeling of an indefinite guilt (Dahl 1999, 61).
Tody
Tody is the extension of tsiny and the expression of the concept of universal
accountability in the Malagasy culture. It expresses the Malagasy’s moral law of cause
and effect (Fox 1990, 31). It “is understood to be the working out of cosmic retributive
justice. Good and evil deeds have their ways of repaying their authors in kind”
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The English translation of Andriamanjato (1957) was taken from Dahl (1995, 61).
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(Rasolondraibe 1989, 347).68 It implies the retribution from the disrespect or negligence
of societal rules. It means “result,” or “response,” the consequence of one’s actions—
immanent justice (Dahl 1999: 62).
In other words, the Malagasy believe that everybody is accountable in everything
that he/she does. No bad action is irreprehensible, and one always has to face the
consequences of one’s actions” (Dahl 1999, 70). Tsiny is the “appropriate consequences
to human actions according to an order which is part of our world, or, as we know it,
justice, like sooner or later retribution of a wrongful action” (Niekerk 2006, 39).
“…Tody, ‘requital, return, recompense,’ is a complex metaphysical concept very similar
to the Hindu or Buddhist karma. Essentially, it postulates that every act—good or evil—
is requited in kind” (Fox 1990, 418). The punishment or the result of one’s actions is
conducted by impersonal force through other people or by the universal order of justice
(e.g., Andriamanjato 1957; Dahl 1999; Navone 1987; Rajaona 1963).69
Power of Tsiny and Tody
Tsiny and tody are usually associated. “The offense or tsiny will eventually find
retribution or tody” (Kus and Raharijaona 2001, 130). They imply that all deeds will be
rewarded or sanctioned. They can be brought to oneself and one’s family depending on
the actor’s deeds. The concept suggests that Malagasy people believe in implied Divine
sanctions. Rogers (1985, 218) explains this concept very well:
68

“An evil act may or may not evoke tsiny, but it always brings about a tody. A good deed may be
thankless, but its tody is forthcoming. Malagasy Christians also believe in tody—not only its existence but
also its legitimacy as a cosmic form of justice” (Rasolondraibe 1989, 347).
69
The concept of tody is illustrated in many Malagasy proverbs and hain-teny (oral literature) such as
Todin-karena harena, todim-pitia fitia, todin’aina aina—“The tody of wealth is wealth, the tody of love is
love, the tody of life is life.” Raha todim-paty aza manody fa raha todim-pitia manodiava—“If the tody is
death, may it not return, but if the tody is love, may it return.” (Fox 1990, 31).

87
“Implied Divine sanctions” has a twofold meaning. Firstly it refers to the direct
intervention of God (or Andriamanitra), and secondly it refers to the function of
the Ancestors (or razana)… Andriamanitra (the Fragrant Lord) or Zanahary (the
Creator) is the ultimate source of all beings and all order….The razana
(ancestors) determine the patterns of society, approve or disapprove of marriages,
and are closely involved in the daily life of the living.
The reward and punishment can be personal as well as collective or extended to
the havana (genealogical or artificial). People are reminded about them all to the time as
we can see in the most popular Malagasy proverbs:


Proverbs that convey the concept of personal reward and retributions:
o “Ny tody tsy misy, fa ny atao no miverina”: “The tody is none other than
the retribution of your own deed.”
o “Mandrora mitsilany ka mahavoa tena”: “If you spit when lying on your
back it will land on yourself.” 70
o “Ny atao toy ny salaka: soa atao manodidina, ratsy atao manodidina”:
“Deeds are like a loindoth: well worn, it snakes around you; badly worn, it
snakes around you.”



Proverbs that convey the concept of collective reward and retributions:
o “Jejo reny ka botry anaka”: “Loose mother: indigent children.”
o “Zaza mivalana am-pandriana: voa ray voa reny”: if a baby messes the
family bed, father and mother are dirtied.

The transgression of customs and taboos inflict tsiny and tody. Malagasy people
have a constant fear of incurring tsiny (blame) and tody (punishment) because of the
preeminent role of the norms and values from fihavanana. Therefore, the fear of tsiny and
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Proverb translation was taken from Rogers (1985).
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tody has many ripple effects on Malagasy behavior. First, it makes them cautious or even
over cautious in what they do because of the fear to break the customs that define taboos.
Sometimes, the two institutions push people to take extreme positions, by not doing
anything because of the fear of making crude mistakes. Second, it leads to
circumspection, moderation, and even a certain fatalism (Nelson et al. 1973). Third, it is a
source of interpersonal respect as each individual tries to avoid anything that may cause
any offense. That explains “the extreme politeness that the Malagasy exhibit toward one
another and their reluctance to contradict” (Nelson et al. 1973). Any confrontation has to
be dealt carefully to respect fihavanana and save everybody’s face.
Fihavanana, Tsiny, Tody, and Entrepreneurship
Fihavanana, tsiny and tody promote informal entrepreneurship in different ways.
It is an important asset for entrepreneurs, especially in the rural areas, where the concept
of formal entrepreneurship is less important. The analysis of interview surveys conducted
by Andrianjafy-Andriamiandrisoa in 2001 shows the different roles that fihavanana plays
in promoting informal entrepreneurship.71 On the one hand, it provides intangible
resources such as moral and informational supports for entrepreneurs. The moral and
informal supports are in forms of advice about the types of business activities necessary
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The interviews of 147 rural households were collected by Dr. Andrianjafy-Andriamanindrisoa in the
commune of Masindray, Antananarivo, Madagascar in 2001. Survey methodology and scripts can be found
in her book entitled Economie populaire, territoires et développement à Madagascar: Les dimensions
historiques, économiques et socio-culturelles du fokonolona. Etude de cas: la commune rurale de
Masindray et la commune urbaine d’Anosibe.2004. Masindray is a rural commune, 20 miles outside
Antananarivo, capital of Madagascar. It has a population of 1,178 people. Even though people are
predominantly farmers, most of them have a small business. Examples of small businesses found in the
Masindray are dairy, tannery, trading, construction, restaurant and fast-food, embroidery, carpentry and
woodwork, pottery, etc. 80% of those who were interviewed own a small business as a secondary activity
and additional source of income. 20% of them have a small business as their primary activity and source of
income.
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in the community, the way to start a business or run it, the types of people to consider as
partners or not, the best location for the business, and the indication of the sources of
resources necessary for the business.
On the other hand, it provides tangible resources such as financial support, and
labor and skills. The financial supports take the form of loans from the genealogical kin
in most cases. The term and condition of the loan and the repayment are arranged
between the havana to ensure that social harmony is maintained. The agreement is based
on consensus or the understanding of mutual help and the uncertainty of the future.
Caution is taken during the agreement according to the rule of tsiny and tody because the
person that lends money at this time might borrow in the future.
Fihavanana is a source of labor for family businesses, which employ family
members in most cases. Giving a job to a havana is a noble action because of the
customary obligations to put the havana as first in resource allocation, the principle of
mutual help between family members, and the different benefits from hiring them (cheap
labor, profits stays in the family, etc). All of these actions prevent the infliction of tsiny
and tody to the entrepreneurs. The mutual help between family members is very
important because it is usually women who own and run the family business. It is a
principal source of income for single mothers or an additional activity and secondary
source of income if they are married. Examples of family business include car shop,
dairy, pork and cattle raising, hand crafts, and embroidery.
People also get personnel supports from their network based on the artificial
havana. These networks are church, NGOs, and informal association or club. The help or
support from the artificial havana is usually temporary because their help is expected
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during the time of difficulty or emergency. Job training is another resource provided by
fihavanana. People receive training from their network, which can be from family or
non-family members. Those who have the know-how share with others their knowledge
and skills for different reasons: (1) to help those who lack skills and training, (2) and
improve their productivity, but (3) at the same time to alleviate the burden from their
dependence on those who are better-off in the community. The tangible and intangible
resources provided by fihavanana, tsiny and tody confirm the hypothesis that informal
institution is positively related with informal entrepreneurship. The benefactors and
receivers take these resources very seriously because of the rules established in tsiny and
tody which say that “the tody is none other than the retribution of your own deed.”
Fihavanana encourages the practice in the informal sector due to its effect on
bureaucracy. However, the best way to explain this second argument is through the
interaction of institutions because it illustrates the effects of the rules from fihavanana
and tsiny and tody on civil servants who handle business registrations and on
entrepreneurs who want to register their business.
3.6. Interactions of Formal Institutions (Business Entry Regulations)
and Informal Institutions (Fihavanana and Tsiny and Tody)
and Entrepreneurship
The interaction of business entry regulations with moramora, fihavanana, tsiny
and tody determines entrepreneurship distribution in the formal and informal market.
Bureaucracy, which handles the business entry procedure, is the battleground where the
interaction occurs. The imbalance between the strength of each set of institutions drives
the interaction mechanism. The interaction is complex because it is a blend of weak
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formal institutions and strong informal institutions. The lack of enforcement mechanism
in the formal institutions allows the informal institutions to influence the outcomes of the
interactions. It means that informal institutions of fihavanana, tsiny, and tody are in
competition with formal institutions. The effect of fihavanana, tsiny and tody on
bureaucracy determines the distributions of entrepreneurship in the formal and informal
sector.
3.6.1. Effect of Informal Institutions—Fihavanana, Tsiny and Tody on Bureaucracy
In spite of their importance, the values of interpersonal relations, mutual trust, and
mutual help found in fihavanana pose problems to bureaucratic efficiency. They may
weaken bureaucracy because people’s interests are not necessarily on the common good
but on personal gains. The issue becomes complex when they face the decision to
allocate scarce resources since they value interpersonal relations more than anything else.
In this case, people prefer the genealogical havana over the artificial havana. Helping
others, especially those who have ties with you, is a priority. Not doing so is a source of
tsiny, which in turn becomes tody, and nobody wants to be afflicted by tody. Since the
formal form of tody is distant or almost inexistent due to the lack of enforcement and
punishment mechanism in the formal institutions, then civil servants have more fear of
the immediate infliction of tody if they do not help their havana. Thus, it makes
bureaucracy inefficient by promoting abuse of power and encouraging nepotism and
favoritism due to its selective nature based on genealogical vs. artificial havana.
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Abuse of Power
The abuse of power comes from the concept of power relations in Madagascar,
which is based on the principle of the elder. Fihavanana gives “elder” a multifaceted
meaning, which makes the meaning of power relation ambivalently complex in the
Malagasy culture. “Elder” has two meanings according to fihavanana: ray aman-dreny
(biological parents) and raiamandreny (elder in general or ex officio, usually anybody
that has a leadership position). The Malagasy have a high regard and respect for elders
without any distinction whether they are ray aman-dreny (biological parents) or
raimandreny (elder in general). Their position and the respect that comes with it give
them power and authority.
The existence of ray aman-dreny (biological parents) and raiamandreny (elders in
general) implies zanaka (children), which has two meanings: zanaka (biological children
for biological parents—ray aman-dreny) and vahoaka (people for elders in general—
raiamandreny). The cohabitation of elders and zanaka generates rights and duty for the
two entities. On the one hand, elders have the rights to be consulted and respected, which
give them an authoritative position and the duty to care, and provide leadership.72 Also,
they are expected to look after their zanaka (children). They are sources of life and light,
graces and protections, and ensure social integration (Razafintsalama 1988). On the other
hand, zanaka are expected to respect and follow the instruction of their elders.
The eldership position and the respect that the vahoaka (people as fictive
children) should give to the raiamandreny (elder in general) become a source of abuse of
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Bloch (1971) extensively addressed this concept when he explained the decision-making in the
Merina tribe.
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power. Elders’ advice has the character of orders, and disobedience harms the virtuous
force of the soul (Jϋtersonke et al. 2010, 36). Some elders such as bureaucrats take
advantages of the rights of eldership and abuse the vahoaka or the public service users.
This is one of the reasons that make Malagasy bureaucracy too demanding. Bureaucrats
are not approachable to the extent that asking their service is interpreted as begging. It is
a parallel to the familiar situation where a child will come to his/her ray aman-dreny
(father and mother) with a concern or a complaint, and ask for help (Dahl 1999, 116).
The concept of “begging” is reflected in hardship that people confront when they deal
with Malagasy civil servants. This is due to the fact that Malagasy bureaucrats are known
by the art of making things difficult. It is their second nature to show their power because
they have the discretionary power to give the answer. Everybody that has power wants to
show it, and carelessly treats their fellow citizens under the pretext of bureaucratic policy.
The implication of the bureaucratic abuse culture is that, the vahoaka or the public
service users are afraid of bureaucracy, especially for the rural population and those who
did not receive education. The fear of bureaucracy and bureaucratic abuse becomes an
obstacle to business formalization and an incentive to stay in the informal market
(Pitchboule 2009). This scenario confirms the hypothesis that the interactions of formal
and informal institutions affect informal institutions.
Nepotism and Favoritism
Because of the affinity from fihavanana and the limited resources, elders
(bureaucrats in this case) prioritize the group of people that they want to serve. The
prioritization criterion is based on the four meanings of fihavanana: tapaka (kin) sy
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namana (acquaintances), havana (relatives) aman-tsakaizana (very close friends). Even
though the characteristic of fihavanana Malagasy is inclusive, the application of the
inclusiveness in real life depends on the symbolic distance of the four categories of
havana from the actor. This concept is illustrated in the most popular proverb in
Madagascar saying: “Raha maty aho, matesa Rahàvana, raha maty Rahàvana, matesa ny
omby ao am-bala” or “If I am to die let one of my hàvana die first, but if one of the
havàna has to die, may the oxen in the pen die first.” Tsiny and tody reinforce the rules or
principles of helping those who are closest to one in daily life. A person who undermines
his immediate havana is looked down and ridiculed according to the proverb saying:
“Varimbarian’ny lavitra, ka tsy mahita ny ambany maso” or “He is distracted by what is
far away and does not see what is before his eyes” (Kœnig 1984, 36).
In the case of a civil servant, the decision to help or not to help (customer service)
depends on the civil servant’s assessment of the weight of the tsiny that he might receive
from his/her supervisors and the public users and the relationship he/she has with them.
And since we know that Malagasy civil service lacks formal enforcement mechanism,
then it is more likely that the informal enforcement mechanism of tsiny (and tody) drives
the civil servants’ action. To avoid tsiny from havana and the community, the principle
which consists in putting havana first is always applied based on the popular proverb:
“Ny havana aza mba hadinoina, toy ny kitapo hahafahana entana” or “Do not leave your
relatives as you would an emptied bag.”
Civil servants also weigh the tody or the retribution or the reward of their action,
which may come from God and ancestors (razana). The razana, which is ray aman-dreny
(biological or artificial elders) can mean Fanjakana i.e. the state. So when, razana i.e.
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Fanjakana is weak (by not having enforcement or punishment mechanism to reprimand
illegal actions) in the formal transaction then people have to rely on God’s punishment
because God hands the verdict in the last resort (e.g., Navone 1977, 1987; Rogers 1985).
However, God’s punishment may take time; therefore they are less worried about
complying with the formal rules of the game.
In the informal institutions realm, tody may come faster because anybody who
does not help others in the community will receive immediate punishment such as
alienation, disgrace, etc. People know each other in the community, and the news about
the failure of one person to look after his/her havana spreads very fast. It is different
when it comes to the transaction in the formal institution, which is more impersonal,
since public users do not necessarily know public servants. Therefore, tody is more
distant in dealings with government officers than in the community interactions.
Bureaucratic resource allocation then depends largely on the symbolic distance
between the bureaucrats and the users. Thus, fihavanana and tsiny and tody opens the
door to corruption, nepotism, favoritism, immunity, and preferential treatment given to
havana (e.g., Jϋtersonke et al. 2010; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2001). Preferential
treatment given to havana is normal in the administrative transactions. This explains the
poor customer service in the Malagasy civil service.
A situation favorable to corruption has been created, when the loyalty to
immediate havana, the ultimate power of bureaucrats as ray aman-dreny, the concept of
public users as “beggars” meet together, and the reinforcement of tsiny and tody are
gathered. Those who do not have any clouts, family tie, or connection with the
bureaucrats are the “beggars,” which are basically the majority of the Malagasy. People
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expressed in the different forum discussions and newspapers that they have to beg before
anything can happen.73 The “begging” phenomena present a win-win situation of bribery
for both bureaucrats and users (who are not a civil servant’s havana) due to the delay and
complexity of the registration process.
From the above perspectives, the interaction of moramora, fihavanana, tody and
tsiny with business entry regulations, which are handled by a weak bureaucratic system,
creates two distinct paths of entrepreneurship. In other words, the interaction plays two
contradictory roles by filtering the entry to the formal sector and accommodating the
practice in the informal sector.
3.6.2. Institutional Interactions and Formal Entrepreneurship
The interaction of formal institutions with fihavanana and tsiny and tody filters
those who can enter the formal market because of the high transaction costs associated
with the dysfunctional relations between the formal and informal institutions. The
transaction costs come from the poor customer services, long delay in service delivery,
and corruption and bribery or the “begging” event. The likelihood of an entrepreneur to
have a close tie with a bureaucrat is very minimal because civil servants only represent a
small percentage of the Malagasy people. Therefore, entry to the formal sector is limited
to few privileged or selected entrepreneurs only.
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Ny Orinasa Malagasy sy Frantsay. TopMada Forum. www.webcache.googleusercontent.com/search
?q=cache:UUjppVgi2_4J:www.topmada.com/forum/discussions-libres/ny-orinasa-malagasy-synyfrantsay/+biraom-panjakana&cd=27&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a&source=www.google.com.
Accessed March 9, 2011. “Kolikoly eo amin’ny raharaham-panjakana” Seraseara.Org.:
www.forum.serasera.org/forum/message/m4451bf9845f3e. Accessed March 9, 2011. Taratasy Misokatra.
Madagascar Tribune. 2009. www.madagascar-tribune.com/Taratasy-misokatra,11616.html, April 6.
Accessed March 9, 2011.
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Favoritism and Formal Entrepreneurship
The interaction favors those who have havana or clouts in the administration.
Let’s take as an example the business formalization during the first epoch of the political
development of Madagascar (1960-1972). During this period, the formal sector was
almost reserved for the members of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), French, and other
foreigner entrepreneurs (e.g., Chinese, Indian/Karana, and Greek). The system in place
was designed to benefit them. It was easier for them to register their business because
most of the civil servants were PSD members and senior administrative positions were
held by French functionaries or Malagasy who were trained under the French system. The
key to the access and advancement in business and other affairs in civic life was the
passage through the PSD party (Allen 1995). They received economic and financial
incentives to establish their business such as financing, the provision of enterprise
preferential treatment, and tax and tariff concessions (World Bank 1974). These
incentives were supported by the series of investment acts intended to promote private
investment. One of them was the Investment Act 61-027 on October 09, 1961, which
favored foreign investors over the nationals. Two other investment acts also were adopted
in 1962 as an extension of the 1961 Act (Code des Investissements—JORM 1962/
Ordonnance N° 62-024 du 9 Septembre 1962 and Ordonnance N° 62-026 du 19
Septembre 1962). They were intended to “encourage a moderate amount of local capital
investment by French residents and companies” (Heseltine 1971) and establish the
National Society of Investment (Société Nationale d’Investissement) which had the roles
of providing capital, action, and financing for the new Malagasy enterprises. The
outcomes of these measures contributed to the growth of the formal sectors that were
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dominated by the French, other foreigners, and few Malagasy enterprises (Douessin
1962).
French enterprises were present in all economic sectors such as agriculture,
services, manufactures, etc.74 This situation is reflected in the data on 415 of the largest
formalized commercial establishments in Madagascar in 1968-69. Almost 75% of total
businesses were French-owned. They were in wholesaling, importing, and manufacturing
sector. Twenty five percent were owned by Asian descent and Malagasy people. Most of
them were involved in the wholesaling than importing (INSRE 1967). The distribution of
entrepreneurial activities based on the current entry regulation system was designed to
maintain the colonial policy to use the colony as a source of cheap raw materials and
unprocessed products and a market place for manufactured product from the colonial
power.
“Karana” (Indo-Pakistani or of Indian descent) and Chinese were the other
foreign entrepreneurs. They owned some smaller regional ventures (Jϋtersonke et al.
2010). The two Asian communities were middlemen in the Malagasy economy to support
the French firms. They were actively involved in trade or commerce. They were trade
retailers in the rural areas, wholesalers and retailers in the urban areas. Some of them
specialized in import and export. As middlemen, their role was to buy, market, and sell
crops from the farmers for the French businesses and enterprises, and sell the
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Four French corporations monopolized all import and export sectors, which specialized in different
activities French interests controlled major enterprises and production (Allen 1995). The Compagnie
Lyonnaise invested in coffee, tobacco, and rice. The Companie Marseillaise specialized in coffee and sugar.
The Compagnie Rochefortaise controlled the meat exportation with the Société Industrielle et Commerciale
de l’Emyrne.
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manufactured product from France back to the country.75 Most of the Karana settled in
the West coast of Madagascar. They were more involved in different sector of the
economy such as lending or advancing loans, crops collection and marketing, trade,
textile retailing, and jewelry (Brown 2000; Slawecki 1971; Thompson and Adloff 1965).
The Chinese chose the East coast were almost exclusively middleman traders, with a
heavy concentration in commerce, especially in the grocery business, transportation and
services. Their role as intermediary was very important because not only did they provide
goods from rural areas and services for the French firms but also they were used to
maintain Malagasy peasants’ interest in agriculture for export trade as they made
monetary profits (which were very meager) from those activities.
The last group of entrepreneurs was a few privileged Malagasy people.
Government’s efforts to promote the involvement of Malagasy nationals in
entrepreneurship and industrial development had limited results because it was driven by
the policy to comfort the PSD party. Malagasy entrepreneurs were insufficient during this
period even though the potential existed (World Bank 1974). The number of Malagasy
businessmen was very insignificant at the eve of independence—perhaps 30 industrialists
and 100 merchants who were involved in large scale sectors. They mostly came from
prominent families from the highlander elite, and lived in Antananarivo province
(Deschamps 1961; Thompson and Adloff 1965).
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They did not see themselves as rivals because the Karana were involved in the big businesses
whereas the Chinese in small businesses in their respective roles of economic agent intermediaries and
channels of goods and products from and to the French companies.
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The creation of enterprises by the non-elite Malagasy was small and almost
unnoticeable because the market was still largely foreign-controlled, mostly by French
firms. Hugon (1978) reports that the market share of indigenous Malagasy firms (both
public and private) was only 5%. According to the compilation made by Pryor (1990,
2010), only 2.3% of wholesaling and 1.5% of importing firms were owned by Malagasy
entrepreneurs. They only had some significant share in the manufacturing, in which they
accounted for about 14% in 1967. Regardless of the growth and the important potential in
the trade sector, Malagasy entrepreneurs involved in the wholesale trade were still
insignificant. Only 39 out of 415 large wholesale firms, which is 9.6%, were owned and
managed by Malagasy citizens (World Bank 1974). However, significant participation in
the retail trade was noticed, in which Malagasy entrepreneurs represented 75% of retail
trade businesses. Little growth of entrepreneurs was seen in 1970, where only 20% of
modern industrial firms were Malagasy. Most of these firms were relatively small; their
share in the value added was only 9%. As far as the small-scaled industry, Malagasy
entrepreneurs owned and managed at least 15,000 small industrial firms in various fields.
Corruption, Bribery, and Formal Entrepreneurship
The interaction of fihavanana, tsiny and tody with business entry regulations
presents an opportunity for corruption and bribery. Some civil servants intentionally
delay the treatment of business registration in order to incite the applicants to engage in
corruption according to the study conducted by the Center for Research, Studies, and
Economic Analysis Support of Madagascar (CREAM) in 2006. Even though, not all
entrepreneurs or bureaucrats are involved in corruption or bribery, a significant number
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of them are still practicing it, especially when economic status is the most determinant of
corruption practice in Madagascar (Casals & Associates 2006). Entrepreneurs are
perceived as rich, which increases the likelihood of them being victims of bureaucratic
corruption. Big entrepreneurs are the prime targets for corruption and rent-seeking
behavior according to the firm interviews in representative industrial sectors conducted in
July 2001 by Cadot and Nasir (2001).76 It implies that those who can afford the cost of
corruption are another category of entrepreneurs that enter the formal sector. Corruption
or bribery, which is the negative outcome of the interaction, is the way out if a person
wants to get his license faster. 49% of 300 formal entrepreneurs and 52% of 120 informal
entrepreneurs who participated in the Enterprise Surveys in 2009 identified corruption as
a major constraint to their activities.
Must Wait for a License Phenomenon
The interaction of fihavanana, tsiny and tody with business entry regulation forces
those who do not have any choice but have to wait for a license due to the nature of their
business. I call this situation as “Must Wait for a License Phenomenon.” In reality, the
number of waiting days is much greater than what is reported in the official document.
For example, it actually took 41 days77 to obtain an operating license instead of 7 days78
as reported in the Doing Business Index according to the survey of formal entrepreneurs
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The report and findings from this study can be found in the World Bank report RPED Paper No. 117
entitled “Incentives and Obstacles to Growth: Lessons from Manufacturing Case Studies in Madagascar”
by Cadot, Olivier and John Nasir. 2001.
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This is the actual figure collected from entrepreneurs’ survey in 2009 by the World Bank (2009b).
Madagascar Enterprise Surveys. www.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=117&year
=2009. Accessed February 15, 2011.
78
This figure is the official number of days in 2009 published by the World Bank (2009a) Doing
Business Index.
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conducted in 2009.79 The long waiting time is another outcome of fihavanana on
bureaucracy when its emphasis on interpersonal relation is associated with the Malagasy
conception of time as cyclical and event-related. Time in this conception posits that what
counts is the “accomplished task” but not the time necessary to get it done. Therefore, it
is impossible to provide a time precision to complete a task.
The long delay in getting business license creates a new category of entrepreneurs
that are channeled to the formal sector due to the interactions of formal and informal
institutions since not all entrepreneurs can afford the cost associated with it. They are
large scale enterprises, which are mostly foreign private investors (e.g., Mauritians, South
Africans, Taiwanese, South Koreans, etc). They “must wait for a license” because they
cannot practice in the informal sector due to their characteristics. A good example of this
category is the enterprises in the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) who must register to be
able to establish in Madagascar. The uncertainties engendered by the undefined time to
get the license cause frustrations and unnecessary additional cost to entrepreneurs. The
report from firm interviews in representative industrial sectors conducted by Cadot and
Nasir in July 2001 confirms that statement. It shows that obtaining work permits for
expatriates is extremely difficult. It also mentions that it took over six months for one
French investor to obtain a permit even though he has already invested over $300,000 in
his company (Cadot and Nasir 2001, 15). “It is a constant battle to obtain basic services
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Business registration is not the only procedure that requires a long waiting-time. The official number
of days necessary to meet the set of regulations affecting the 8 stages of a business’s life in Madagascar is
very long. The stages are: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property,
getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, and enforcing contracts. The 8
stages require a total of 99 procedures and have a waiting time of 1,183.38 days (equivalent to 3 years and
24 days) in 2011. In average, each procedure takes almost 12 days (11.95 days). The calculation was taken
from 2011 Doing Business Index in Madagascar.
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from government offices and that many officials do not seem interested in helping firms
solve problems or overcome the difficult business environment” (Cadot and Nasir 2001,
15).
The profile of formal entrepreneurship being limited to few privileged and
selected entrepreneurs only confirms the hypothesis that the interaction of formal
institutions measured by entry regulations with informal institutions fihavanana, tsiny
and tody determines the distribution of entrepreneurship in Madagascar. The interaction,
which promotes favoritism, bribe and corruption, and delay in service delivery, filters
those who can enter the formal sector due to the influence of fihavanana, tsiny and tody
on bureaucracy. The formal sector is then reserved for three categories of entrepreneurs:
those who are associated with the bureaucrats; those who can afford the cost of
corruption and bribery, and those who must wait for a license because of the nature of
their business.
3.6.3. Institutional Interactions and Informal Entrepreneurship
The interaction of entry regulations with fihavanana, and tsiny and tody
accommodates informal entrepreneurship by default. Those who cannot enter the formal
sector do not have the choice except entering or remaining (temporarily or permanently)
in the informal sector. This situation creates a profile of informal sector in Madagascar. It
consists of small-scale and indigenous private sectors. It provides employment for a vast
majority of the population. These enterprises operate mostly in farm activities in rural
areas; whereas non-farm activities function in urban areas in general.
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Urban Informal Enterprises
The data from the survey of informal sector conducted in 2009 by Enterprise
Surveys give a profile of enterprises in the informal sector in urban areas (Table 3.5).
They are small firms employing less than three people including the owner. Ownership
between men and women are almost equal in the case of joined ownership. The majority
of entrepreneurs, who are less educated, have taken advantage of a business opportunity
and started their businesses alone or with partners. Most of the businesses are located
outside the household premises. They are in manufacturing (e.g., food, textiles, garments,
electronics, etc.) and services (e.g., retail, trade, hotel and restaurant, construction,
transport, etc.) industries.
The interaction of entry regulations with fihavanana, and tsiny and tody facilitates
the creation of informal enterprise in the urban areas. First, they could not afford the
transaction costs associated with business formalization due to the dysfunction of
institution interaction. Therefore, they might stay in the informal sector temporarily or
permanently. The majority of the participants in the informal sector survey (48.03%)
claimed that entry procedures are the main obstacles to the registration of their business.
The procedures are as follows: “time to complete registration procedure” (7.87%),
“getting information on what you need to do to register” (13.39%), and “fees to complete
registration procedure” (26.77%).80 When each of the pre-registration procedure is
analyzed (Table 3.6), we found that 73.23% of participants (as average responses) said
that the pre-registration procedures are an obstacle to registration.
80

The other obstacles to business registration, which occur after the registration, are “taxes on
registered businesses” (45.67%), “bribes that registered businesses need” (3.15%), “the inspections and
meetings with government officials” (1.57%), and “ignorance—don’t know” (1.57%).
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Table 3.5
Profile of Urban Informal Sector According to the Sample
from 2009 Informal Enterprise Surveys
Profile

Percentage

Number of Owners

One individual (76.38%)
Two individuals (21.26%)

Gender of Owners

Male (80%)
Female (20%)

Joint Ownership

Male (50.39%)
Female (48.82%)

Business ownership
acquisition

Started on their own or with partners (96.06%)
Joined an existing family business (3.94%)

Reason to start the business

To take advantage of a business opportunity (60.63%)
Jobs or opportunities were absent or not satisfactory (39.37%)

Level of education of the
main decision maker in the
business

No education (3.94%)
Primary school—complete or not (35.43%)
Secondary school—complete or not (41.73%)
Vocational training (11.02%)
Some university training (7.87%)

Employees working in the
business including owner and
family members at start up

One—owner (56.69%)
Two (25.20%)
Three (11.02%)
More than three (7.09%)

Industrial sector of the
business

Retail (27.56%)
Other manufacturing—e.g., plastics & rubber, basic metals,
machinery, etc. (22.05%)
Food manufacturing (14.17%)
Textiles and garments manufacturing (12.60%)
Other service—e.g., Hotel and restaurant, transport, IT,
wholesale, etc.) (23.63%)
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Table 3.6
Analysis of the Pre-Registration Procedure
Pre-Registration

No obstacle
(%)

Obstacle
(%)

Don’t
know
(%)

Getting information on what you need to do to register

33.86

61.42

4.72

Time to complete registration procedures

18.90

76.38

4.72

Fees to complete registration procedures

12.60

81.89

5.51

9.45

85.83

4.72

The inspections and meetings with government
officials registered businesses must have

36.22

57.48

6.30

Bribes that registered businesses need to pay

59.84

59.84

5.51

Post Registration
Taxes on registered businesses

Second, people who enter the informal sector may not have any interests in the
formal sector because practicing in the informal sector does not present high risk to their
business venture. The absence of a license does not prevent them to run their business
even though they are aware of the benefits of having it.81 They are able to finance the day
to day operations of their business through internal funds (81.89% of participants), credit
from suppliers or advances from customers (10.24%), or other sources of funding such as
money lenders, microfinance institutions, and friends/relatives, etc (6.30%). In addition,
staying in the informal market benefits entrepreneurs because there is no fee associated
with it. State weakness in enforcing registration law and providing public goods
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The participants list the following as a benefit for their business activities if their business was
registered: better access to financing (38.58% of participants), better access to market (17.32%), better
opportunities of negotiation with formal firms (14.96%), better access to raw materials (10.24%), more
access to government programs or services (8.66%), better legal foundations on the property rights of land
and buildings (6.30%), and better access to services (3.94%).
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facilitates the blossoming of the informal enterprise.82 Operating in the informal sector is
free; only 2.36% of the participants claimed that they had to make an informal payment
in order to remain unregistered.
Rural Informal Enterprises
In rural areas, business formalization is not a major issue because the lack of
business license is not an obstacle to business creation and operation in the
predominantly rural and agricultural economy of Madagascar. Eighty percent of the
Malagasy population lives in rural area. Agriculture represents 90 % of employment in
rural areas, whereas it is 45% in urban centers (Hoftijzer and Paci 2008; World Bank
1995, 2005, 2006b). Economic activities are marked by small-scale indigenous private
sector, in which household enterprise or family business employs 86% of the rural
populations and approximately 75% of the secondary urban population (Hoftijzer and
Paci 2008). Registered or not, entrepreneurs can still operate. In addition, fihavanana,
backed by the informal reinforcement from tsiny and tody, provides enough resources to
ensure entrepreneurial success in the informal sector.
The values of interpersonal relations that come from the moramora and
fihavanana promotes reciprocity and social exchanges. They are reinforced by tsiny and
tody because of the collectivistic nature of the Malagasy community in which mutual
help ensures its functioning and survival. These values are very important to meet the
82

Saavedra-Chanduvi (2007, 215) addresses this concept extensively in his article: “Burdensome
business and labor market regulations, poorly designed social protection systems, and weak enforcement
capabilities bias the cost–benefit assessments of firms and workers in favor of informality. Furthermore, a
collective perception of ineffectiveness, unfairness, and illegitimacy of the state’s actions, in terms of who
it represents and serves, can give rise to a social norm of noncompliance with taxes and regulations (a
“culture of informality”), which further undermines the state’s capacity to enforce the law and to provide
effective public services.”
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small scale orientation of the rural economy (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten 1999; Winters,
Corral, and Gordillo 2001). Hyden (1980) calls this type of economy an “economy of
affection,” which is defined “a network of support, communications and interactions
among structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other
affiliations” (Hyden 1983, 8).
The means provided by fihavanana are a perfect illustration of economy of
affection because of the solidarity and mutual help from the genealogical havana and
artificial havana. Mutual help and reciprocity ensure community harmony and successes
in economic activities. The concept of mutual help is practiced through valin-tanana and
atero ka alao. Valin-tanana means exchange of goods and services within the community
to meet others’ needs. It says that we are your hands today, and you will be ours
tomorrow. The entire community is involved in valin-tanana by helping each other to
achieve their own entrepreneurial endeavor. Atero ka alao is more individual because it
implies individual accountability. I help you today because you will help me tomorrow.
The type of help varies from financial, materials, moral support, fandriaka, tamby-ro, and
lampagno.
The profile of the informal entrepreneurs in Madagascar confirms the hypothesis
that the interaction of formal institutions (business entry regulations) with fihavanana and
tsiny and tody promotes informal entrepreneurship. They operate in the informal sector
because they cannot afford the cost of formalization, do not have any network in the
bureaucracy, and are not interested in business formalization due to the nature of their
activities. In addition, fihavanana provides them with the necessary resources they need
to run their business.
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3.7. Conclusion
This chapter explains the factor behind the distribution of entrepreneurship in
Madagascar, which is marked by the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship, by testing
the rival hypotheses about the roles of institutions on entrepreneurship. It shows that the
interaction of formal and informal institutions provides better explanation about the
distribution of entrepreneurship between the formal and informal sector in Madagascar. It
is true that formal institutions through business entry regulations negatively affect
business entry to the formal sector and informal institution (fihavanana and tsiny and
tody) promotes informal entrepreneurship. However, this conclusion is not complete
because it ignores the roles of informal institutions fihavanana, tsiny and tody on
Malagasy people’s behavior without any distinction whether they are civil servants or
entrepreneurs.
The interaction conclusion posits that people’s respect of fihavanana and tsiny
and tody influence the Malagasy bureaucracy that handles business entry regulations,
which in turn determines the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal and informal
sector. The interaction mechanism is complex because it is driven by the imbalance
between the strength of the two institutions. The lack of enforcement mechanism in
bureaucratic rule due to its structural and political legacies puts the formal institutions at
disadvantage when it comes to controlling the interaction. As a consequence, the
intertwined relationship between fihavanana, tsiny, and tody institutions controls the
interaction mechanism. Tsiny and tody reinforce the value of interpersonal relations,
which is central to the informal institutions. Mutual help, based on the categories of
havana becomes the unwritten rules that dictate civil servants’ action and the
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prioritization of their service. The combinations of these different puzzles establish the
sector that an entrepreneur should enter.
Institutional interaction creates conditions that complicate the business
formalization. On the one hand, it filters those who can operate in the formal sector.
Formal entrepreneurs, when filtered through their respective profile, then consist of
(1) those who have havana and clouts in the administration, (2) those who can afford the
cost of corruption and bribery, and (3) those who must wait for a license because of the
nature of their business. On the other hand, it accommodates the practice in the informal
sector. This situation creates a profile of informal entrepreneurs. The profile includes
(1) small urban entrepreneurs who cannot afford the cost of formalization, (2) small
urban entrepreneurs who have less interests in the formal sector because the absence of
the license does not prevent them from starting and operating their business, and (3) rural
entrepreneurs who have least concerns in business formalization because of the support
system embedded in the informal institutions (fihavanana, moramora, and tsiny and
tody). As a conclusion, the study of the distribution of entrepreneurship between the
formal and informal sector in Madagascar shows that the institutional interactions matter
for entrepreneurship.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
4.1. Research Questions
This research attempted to explain the factors behind the variation of enterprise
creation across countries by looking at the roles of formal and informal institutions and
their interactions in the distribution of enterprise in the formal and informal market. It is
interested in clarifying the institutional factors behind the high level of total
entrepreneurship in Sub Saharan Africa where formal institutions are weak and informal
institutions are predominant compared with other regions.83
The research tests competing hypotheses about the individual versus mixed
effects of formal institutions measured by entry regulations and informal institutions
measured by social capital on the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal and
informal sector. It has two theses. The thesis for the individual effects of institutions
claims that formal and informal institutions, independently, affect entrepreneurship when
each institution can provide the best solution to allow entrepreneurs to reach their goals.
The interaction thesis argues that institutional mix matters for the distribution of
entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sector. The outcomes of institutional mix are
influenced by the relative strength of each institution.
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Total entrepreneurship here means the combination of entrepreneurship in the formal and formal
sector (International Entrepreneurship Organization & Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Data).
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I presented four hypotheses to conduct the research. They are related to the
individual and cumulative effects of the formal and informal institutions on formal and
informal entrepreneurship. I used two different methods to analyze the hypotheses. The
first method (Chapter II) is quantitative. It draws a global picture of entrepreneurship by
analyzing data from 48 countries. The second method (Chapter III) is qualitative. It the
effect of business entry regulations and fihavanana (Malagasy social capital) on
entrepreneurship in Madagascar. The following section summarizes the findings from
each method.
4.2. Findings
I divided the four hypotheses used in this research into two categories. The first
category includes Hypotheses 1 and 2, and tests the individual effects of institutions on
each category of entrepreneurship (formal vs. informal). The second category consists of
Hypotheses 3 and 4, and analyzes the effect of the interactions of institutions on formal
and informal entrepreneurship. The findings from the test of each hypothesis are as
follows.
4.2.1. Effects of Each Set of Institutions on Each Category of Entrepreneurship
Hypothesis 1 estimates that a formal institution measured by entry regulations is
inversely related to the formal entrepreneurship. The findings from the quantitative and
qualitative analysis confirm this hypothesis. The role of formal institutions in promoting
formal entrepreneurship is unequivocal both in the cross-country study and the
Madagascar case study. Cumbersome entry regulations discourage formal
entrepreneurship.
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that informal institution measured by social capital is
positively related to the informal entrepreneurship. The findings from the quantitative and
qualitative analysis confirm this prediction. Informal institutions such as social capital
play very important roles in promoting informal entrepreneurship according to the crosscountry data analysis. The finding is similar in the study of Madagascar, where informal
institution such as fihavanana contributes to the growth of informal entrepreneurship.
4.2.2. Effects of Institutional Mix on Each Category of Entrepreneurship
Hypothesis 3 estimates that the relationship between informal institutions on
formal entrepreneurship depends on the conditional effects of formal institutions on the
institutional mix. I expect this relationship to be negative as the formal institution
influences the interaction. The data analysis gives two different answers to this
estimation. On the one hand, the results from the quantitative analysis failed to support
this hypothesis. It means that institutional mix does not determine the entry to the formal
sector. On the other hand, the study of the institutional mix in Madagascar confirms the
hypothesis. The interaction of fihavanana, tsiny and tody with business entry regulations
filters those who can operate in the formal sector.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the relationship between formal institutions and
informal entrepreneurship depends on the conditional effects of informal institutions on
the institutional mix. I expect this relationship to be positive as it is driven by the strength
of the informal institution. The quantitative and qualitative studies provide two different
findings about this estimation as we found in Hypothesis 3. The quantitative analysis
does not confirm the role of institutional mix in determining informal entrepreneurship.
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The interaction of entry regulations with social capital does not have any relations with
the operation in the informal sector. However, the qualitative case study of Madagascar
shows that the interaction of fihavanana, tsiny and tody with business entry regulations
promotes and encourages the practice in the informal sector.
4.2.3. Findings Summary
The findings from the hypothesis testing can be summarized as follows (Table
4.1). The findings from the quantitative and qualitative studies are unanimous about the
role of each set of institutions in the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal and
informal sector by controlling the political and economic variables (levels of economic
development, political stability, and control of corruption). They confirm the hypothesis
that formal institution is inversely related to formal entrepreneurship and informal
institution are positively related to the informal entrepreneurship. In other words, each set
of institutions has independent effects on entrepreneurship.
Table 4.1
Individual vs. Mix Effect of Institutions on Entrepreneurship Distribution
Quantitative Study
(Cross-Countries)
Institutions

Qualitative Study (Single
Country, Madagascar)

Entrepreneurship Distribution

Individual Effect

Yes

Yes

Mix Effect

No

Yes

The findings from the two studies disagree on the role of institutional mix on
entrepreneurship distribution in the formal and informal sector. The quantitative analysis
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did not find any relationship between institutional mix and entrepreneurship. The
interaction model is not statistically significant. On the contrary, the qualitative study
finds that the interaction of formal and informal institutions determines the distribution of
entrepreneurship in the formal and informal market. The interaction occurs in
bureaucracy, which handles business entry procedures. The interaction mechanism is
complex because it is driven by the imbalance between the strength of the two
institutions.
4.3. Significance
The findings from this research have three main significant points in the study of
the relation between institutions and the distribution of entrepreneurship as stipulated in
the first chapter of this dissertation. The quantitative analysis confirms the effects of each
set of institutions on the distribution of entrepreneurship, whereas the qualitative study
contends that institutional interactions also matters in some context, especially when the
informal institution competes with the formal one. These two findings (quantitative and
qualitative) help us explain and understand the institutional mechanism behind the
distribution of entrepreneurship in Africa.
4.3.1. Persistence of the Individual Effects of Institution Theory
This research confirms what has been found in the previous research that
institutions have independent and individual effects on the distribution of
entrepreneurship (e.g., Black and Strahan 2002; Hause and Du Rietz 1984; Klapper,
Laeven, and Rajan 2006; Djankov et al. 2002). It then goes further to demonstrate that
each set of institutions (formal vs. informal) is unique, and designs different paths for
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entrepreneurship. In other words, the characteristic and strength of formal and informal
institutions determine the business formation in the formal market and informal market.
Formal institutions measured by business entry registration channel
entrepreneurship to the formal market; whereas informal institutions in terms of structural
social capital direct entrepreneurship to the informal market. Less cumbersome business
entry procedures encourage the entry to formal entrepreneurship, whereas more
cumbersome business entry procedures promote the entry to the informal
entrepreneurship. Social capital measured by voluntary organization does not have any
effect on formal entrepreneurship, but it does on informal entrepreneurship. Higher level
of social capital contributes to the growth of informal entrepreneurship. This makes sense
because people’s social network provides essential resources (e.g., advice, emotional,
technical, and financial support, etc.) to start a business, which usually begins in the
informal market before deciding to enter in the formal market or not.
4.3.2. Reconciling the Findings from the Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis
The quantitative and qualitative studies present conflicting findings about the role
of institutional interactions on entrepreneurship distribution. The quantitative analysis did
not find any relationship between institutional interactions and entrepreneurship
distribution, whereas the qualitative did. The qualitative study shows that institutional
interaction limits the entry to the formal sector and encourages the practice in the
informal sector. The conflicting findings present a puzzle because Madagascar is not an
outlier according to the output from the statistical analysis (in Chapter II). The conflicting
findings revive the debate in the social science research methodology about the merits of
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the use of different methods to analyze a phenomenon as a process of finding validation
or a means of completing the picture of the investigated phenomena (e.g., George and
Bennett 2005; Lieberman 2005; Mahoney and Goertz 2006).
To tackle the issue of the conflicting findings, I focus my explanation on the
possibilities that might play roles in the differences of the findings between the
quantitative and qualitative analysis and their implication for future research rather than
questioning the results of either analysis. There is some reality out there that merits
analysis despite the data limitations and methodological challenges in conducting the
study and their outcomes (e.g., Levy 2007; Rueschemeyer 1991). The fact that
differences might not be reconciled should not discredit the research84 because the two
methods used in this study can be viewed as investigative strategies that offer evidence to
understand socio economic phenomena and inform judgments but not necessarily
techniques that provide guaranteed truth or completeness (Hammersley 2005). The
explanations consist of the conceptualization of institutions, the operationalization of the
informal institutions, and the mechanism of institutional interactions. I present the
direction of future research at the end of the explanation of each concept.
Conceptualization of Institution
The difference between the quantitative and qualitative analyses can be explained
through the concept of institutional continuum. North (1990) argues that the difference
between formal and informal institutions is a matter of degree, moving along a
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Other works have addressed the issue of the conflicting results from two different methods: Ragin
1987; Rueschemeyer 1991; Stephens 1979.
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continuum. Formal and informal institutions are extremes on the institution continuum,
which taboos, customs, and traditions at one end, and written laws at the other (e.g.,
Etzold et al. 2009, 7; North 1990). The independent effects of each institution occur at
these extremes. Their effects depend on their enforcement because institutions only affect
people’s behavior when they are enforced (e.g., North 1990, 2005; Sautet 2005, 4).
People comply with the formal institutions when they are effective. It means that
“written rules and procedures are enforced or complied with in practice and there is a
high probability that noncompliance will be sanctioned by official authorities” (e.g.,
Helmke and Levistky 2006, 13). This is the case in developed and more democratic
countries (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Djankov 2009; Djankov et al.
2002). People adhere to the informal institutions when their actions are influenced by
unwritten and unofficial rules, which generate acceptable and enforced shared
expectations “outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004,
727). In this circumstance, informal institutions compete with, substitute for, dominate,
and replace the formal institutions (e.g., Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Lauth 2002; Sen
2007). Informal institutions have special place in regulating economic activities in
developing countries, particularly in poorer areas (Bratton 2007; World Bank 2002, 4).
From the above perspective, each set of institutions constrains people’s behavior,
depending on their level of enforcement. The findings from the quantitative and
qualitative approaches confirm this statement. It is unequivocal that the distribution of
entrepreneurship is influenced by the independent effect of each set of institutions. The
Formal institutions determine the entry to the formal sector; whereas informal institution
determines the entry to the informal sector. These findings suggest one important point:
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the distribution of entrepreneurship depends on the type of institutions that is enforced. In
other words, individual sets of institutions indeed determine the distribution of
entrepreneurship when people comply with the rules that are enforced.
However, the conceptualization of institutions as a continuum and the emphasis
on the enforcement mechanism within institutions raise a second point where the two
approaches collide; that is, institutional interactions matter to entrepreneurship
distribution as reported in the qualitative analysis. In other words, the concept of
institutional continuum and enforcement mechanism can also imply that, if institutional
interaction exists, then it might be during the different stages of institutional
transformation when the two institutions overlap and the outcome depends on the
institutions that have a higher level of enforcement. However, the precise location of the
overlap in the continuum is not very clear.
The conceptualization of institutions as a continuum and the emphasis on the
enforcement mechanism within institutions open an opportunity for future research where
one can delineate the separate line between the individual and interaction effect of
institutions. This is important because countries have different levels of institutional
effectiveness and are at different stages of institutional transformation. Scholars have
struggled with this issue as they are not conclusive about the appropriate ways to analyze
institutions. One group promotes the classification of institutions based on continuum vs.
dichotomous argument (e.g., Etzold et al. 2009; Leach et al. 1997; North 1991), others
claim the relevance of formal institution effectiveness vs. institutional compatibility (e.g.,
Ake 1996; Bratton 2007; Helmke and Levitsky 2006). Comparative historical analysis of
institutional transformation or evolution is one of the ways we can use to demarcate the
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line that separates the individual versus interaction effect of institutions (e.g., GrzymalaBusse 2010; Rueschemeyer 1991). One should be able to identify the stage when
individual institutions and/or institutional interactions affect the changes in the dependent
variable by looking at the complex sequences (i.e., individual path vs. interaction path) of
institutional transformation or evolution.
Operationalization of Informal Institutions
The observed differences may have to do with the operationalization of (proxy
measure) of informal institutions. I used Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004) definition of
informal institutions in this dissertation. According to them, informal institutions are
“socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced
outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). I chose
social capital as a proxy measure of informal institutions based on the above definition
(e.g., Svendsen and Svendsen 2004; Fukuyama 1995, 2001). Social capital is defined as a
set of social structures (network) and attitudes (values), which has a self-enforcement
mechanism that promotes cooperation because of the existence of mutual trust within the
social network (e.g., Hooghe 2008; Krishna and Uphoff 1999; Putnam 1995; UN Human
Settlements Programme 2003).
The quantitative analysis used voluntary organization membership to represent
social capital based on the argument that “voluntary associations form part of the social
infrastructure of society that makes the generation of trust possible, and that at least
makes it easier for trust relations and trusting attitudes to develop and to re-enforce
themselves within the population” (Anheier and Kendall 2002, 344). The qualitative
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study uses fihavanana to represent social capital. It determines the scope of social
network that a person belongs, and defines and solidifies the boundary of trust between
people in Madagascar. Fihavanana is reinforced by the reward and sanction mechanism
found in tsiny (reproach) and tody (retribution). Even though the two types of social
capital measure are similar in their nature as a source of informal norms that constrain
people’s behavior, they differ from each other in their origin and scope.
On the one hand, the voluntary organization membership has its origin from the
individual’s choice and decision to join (or not) an organization. Active membership in
voluntary organization is expected to spread social capital in the community (e.g.,
Glaeser et al. 2002; Knack and Keefer 1997). Regardless of its merits, voluntary
organization membership has a smaller scope or less effect to the community life because
it only concerns those who are members of an organization and who are interested in the
cost and benefits of the membership (e.g., Hall 1999, 2002; Grenier and Wright 2003).
This might be the case of this study because the mean of the organization membership is
only 6% of the survey participants. Also, the concept of a voluntary organizational
membership may have some constraints because it depends on the level of freedom of
association in the country, the freewill of the citizens, and the culture of the community
being collectivistic or individualistic (e.g., Gellner 1994; Fukuyama 1999, 2002; Norris
2001). In other words, as a proxy to measure social capital, voluntary organizational
membership is an action (people’s decision to join or not). It can be selective because of
the concept of joining and is exclusive because not everybody wants to and can join a
group due to their choice and their sociological context.
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On the other hand, fihavanana is a direct measure of social capital. It has a builtin component of social capital as network and trust. Also, it has its origin from the
conceptual system and social structure of the Malagasy society.85 It implies that
fihavanana is a way of life, thus conviction, but not an outcome of choice like joining or
not joining an organization. The conviction influences people’s actions to uphold the
values found in the genealogical and artificial havana. These values (solidarity, mutual
help, cooperation, trust, etc.) are intrinsic or embedded in the Malagasy mind because of
the effect of socialization and transmission of fihavanana from generations to
generations. Therefore, it has a larger scope; it conditions everybody’s actions and
behavior consciously or unconsciously. Fihavanana shapes the Malagasy people’s action
because of rights to corporate equality and the obligations of solidarity and cooperation
associated with it.
I believe the differences in the origin and scope of the two types of social capital
have implications in the findings from this research. The voluntary organizations
membership is a constructed representation of the level of social capital (informal
institution) in one country, whereas fihavanana is an intrinsic representation of social
capital (informal institution). The difference between the “constructed” and “intrinsic”
concepts is important in understanding the levels of enforceability of the informal
institutions, which is one of the concepts that define informal institutions according to
Helmke and Levitsky (2004). Even though the socially shared rules from the membership
in voluntary organization would spread in the society and generate more social capital
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“The conceptual system looks at the social action (or communication) with respect to its meaning for
those who carry it out; the social aspects refer to concepts in terms of their contribution to the functioning
of some social system” (Dahl 1999, 88).
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according to Putnam (1999, 2000) and Putnam et al. (1993), I argue that these unwritten
shared rules are more likely to be enforced within the circle of the organizations only.
Their influence outside the organizations is minimal. As a consequence, the quantitative
model did not capture the concept of enforceability of the informal rules outside the
formal channel and affect the outcomes of the statistical analysis, whereas the intrinsic
form of informal institutions like fihavanana, however, have higher levels of
enforceability, because it is shared by the entire community, thus applicable to
everybody. People are more likely to adhere to such institutions and comply to its rules
because they are aware of the reward and sanction mechanism that ensures its
enforceability.
The level of scope and enforceability of institutions are crucial in the
understanding the finding discrepancies between the quantitative and qualitative studies
because they can influence the effect of institutions on people’s behavior. The lower level
of the scope and enforceability of the informal rules emanating from the voluntary
membership organizations weakens its effect on people’s behavior outside the
organizations. This might be one of the alternatives to explain the insignificance of
voluntary organizations in the distribution of entrepreneurship in the formal sector. The
quantitative analysis shows that the informal shared rules of trust, mutual help, and
solidarity originated from the voluntary organization membership did not matter to the
creation of enterprise in the formal sector. Business formalization is about bureaucratic
and formal procedures and the above rules did not necessary constrain the behavior of
entrepreneurs in general as well as the bureaucrats who handle the registration process.
The interaction of voluntary organization membership with entry regulations also did not
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have any effect on entrepreneurship distribution because the informal rules for voluntary
associations more likely concern those who are members of the organizations. However,
the voluntary organization membership has a positive relationship with the informal
sector because it may provide resources that are necessary in entrepreneurial activities
especially for those who belong to the organization.86 The effect also might have been
facilitated by the nature of the informal sector as a starting point and a temporary stage to
enter the formal sector.
In the qualitative study, fihavanana has crucial impact in the distribution of
entrepreneurship because of the higher level of its scope and the enforceability of its
rules. Not only does it govern the social and economic interaction of Malagasy people but
it has a mechanism to enforce its rules. The reward and punishment mechanism found in
tsiny and tody enforces the rules in fihavanana and renders them as a moral obligation to
the Malagasy people. In other words, as an institution, fihavanana has a larger impact to
the society than the voluntary organization membership. From this perspective, its effect
on the society is palpable. It shapes bureaucratic and entrepreneurial actions and
constrains their behavior and decisions. As a consequence it captures the effect of
institutional interactions on the distribution of enterprise. The unwritten rules of
fihavanana are detrimental to the formal institutions as their influence on bureaucracy
complicates business formalization procedures. They also provide resources which makes
the practice in the formal sector less attractive. These rules prioritize kinship ties and are
enforced by the reward and punishment mechanism in tsiny (reproach) and tody
(retribution).
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This is in relation to the concept of the level of the scope of the institution and the enforceability of
its rule that are higher within organization.
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The importance of appropriate operationalization of informal institutions presents
an opportunity for future research. Concerning the interactions of institutions and their
effects, the analysis thereof can be improved by using a similar measure of informal
institutions both in the quantitative and qualitative analysis. For example, conducting a
case study of voluntary membership organizations and their interactions with entry
regulations will be useful to test the interaction hypothesis whether it affects the
distribution of entrepreneurship or not. This approach can be conducted on a within
country or cross-country basis by collecting yearly data about the trends of voluntary
membership organization and entrepreneurship creation.
Another approach could consist in creating a quantitative measure of fihavanana,
tsiny, and tody, and in quantitatively test their relationship with the distribution of
entrepreneurship using the competing hypotheses. This approach requires a survey
interview that reflects the concepts of informal rules found in these institutions, their
effects on people’s behavior, their relations with formal institutions (e.g., entry
regulations), and, especially, their impact on the distribution of entrepreneurship. The
same approach should be replicable so that it can be used in different countries.
Mechanism of the Institutional Interaction
The differences in the findings about the effect of institutional interactions on the
distribution of entrepreneurship should not be used to refute the roles of institutional
interactions since we know that institutions matter to economic activities (North 1990;
Williamson 1996) and institutions interact in different ways (Ahlstrom and Cook 2005;
Helmke and Levistky 2004; Peng 2003). The discrepancy then might suggest that it is
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necessary to demonstrate the causal mechanism between the institutions involved, their
purposes, and their compatibility, before establishing the causal inference between the
institutional interactions and their outcomes (Oberthur and Gehring 2006). In other
words, it is crucial to explain the incident of institutional interactions because institutions
do not self-interact by their own, but there are other actors such as states, culture, agents,
political entrepreneurs that drive the interaction mechanism (Oberthur and Gehring
2006). Knowing and considering these actors allow us to understand the mechanism that
drives the interactions and the process that leads to their outcomes. This argument is
illustrated in the case of Madagascar. The interaction of formal institutions (entry
regulations) with informal institutions (fihavanana, tsiny, and tody) is not accidental but it
is the outcome of the bureaucratic agents’ preference to prioritize those who are their
havana.
The above argument suggests that determining the effect of institutional
interactions might involve the search and consideration of additional variables that are
involved in the interaction. I believe that was the issue with the quantitative analysis
because the regression analysis did not capture the roles of the outside factors that
mediate the interactions. This explanation presents an opportunity for future research by
looking at the roles of actors in engineering institutional interactions and the effects of
their preferences on the dependent variable.
This theory can be applied to this dissertation by looking at the mechanism behind
the interactions of formal institutions (business entry regulations) and informal
institutions (voluntary membership organization). More specifically, one needs to
conceptually identify the precise causal mechanism that drives the interaction of the two
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institutions (Elster 1989; Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998). It means that there is a logical
connection between the two institutions, and their interactions can create an observed
effect, which is the distribution of entrepreneurship in this case (Schelling 1998).
Additionally, it is important to identify the actors that engineered the interaction because
it can affect its outcomes. These actors could be the entrepreneurs themselves, the
bureaucratic agents that handle the registration process, or the state. The mechanism of
the interactions and the roles of the actors involved in the process should be
quantitatively or qualitatively operationalized so that the interactions can be empirically
tested. As an illustration, it might be possible (if the data exist) to introduce another
variable such as the “professionalization of bureaucracy” to control the institutional
interaction before one test the interaction hypotheses to see whether institutional
interaction matters to business distribution or not.
4.4. Conclusion
This research attempted to explain the factors behind the variation of enterprise
creation across countries by testing competing hypotheses about the individual versus
interaction effect of formal institutions (measured by entry regulations) and informal
institutions (measured by social capital) on the distribution of entrepreneurship in the
formal and informal sectors. The findings from the qualitative and quantitative analysis
confirmed the hypotheses that each set of institutions has independent effects on
entrepreneurship distribution. Formal institutions are inversely related to formal
entrepreneurship, whereas informal institutions are positively related to informal
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entrepreneurship. The findings settle the discussion about the roles of individual
institutions on entrepreneurship distribution.
The differences of findings about the effects of institutional interactions on
entrepreneurship show the continuing debate about the process and mechanism of
institutional interactions and their effects on people’s behavior. The quantitative analysis
did not confirm the role of institutional interactions in determining entrepreneurship
distribution; whereas the qualitative analysis did. The situation provides opportunity for
future research by refining the research question and research methodology. The
emphasis should be put on the determination of the different stages where each set of
institutions and/or their interactions matter to entrepreneurs’ decision to enter the formal
or informal sector.
The findings from this research have some policy implications. They support the
importance of streamlined and cost-effective business registration as a facilitator of
business formalization. The relevance of each set of institutions in the distribution of
entrepreneurship also provides practical perspectives about institutional reforms. It is
important to design the institutional reform that creates institutional synergy based on the
positive aspects of the informal institutions whenever possible. The goal is to create a
good environment that is conducive to successful economic activity.
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I ran three different model specifications to conduct the quantitative analysis. The
three specifications are the “Original Model,” “Comprehensive Model,” and “Simplified
Model.” This approach was motivated by the fact that the outputs from the Original
Model show some problems due to the data limitation and multicollinearity between
some variables. Appendix B summarizes the outputs from the three models. This section
explains the differences between the three models and presents the rationale that
motivates the choice of the Simplified Model as the best model for the study.
A.1. Original Model (OM)
The original model is the original estimation proposed in this research. It
comprises the following variables: two dependent variables (formal entrepreneurship and
informal entrepreneurship); one independent variable—composite index of social capital;
and the three control variables: economic development (GDP per PPP), political stability,
and control of corruption.
The findings from the original model (Appendix B) show some inconsistencies
between the hypotheses and the outcomes. The inconsistencies are found in the effect of
informal institutions/social capital index and the control variables (level of economic
development and political stability). I believe they are caused by two factors: the use of
the composite index to measure social capital and the presence of multicollinearity
between the control variables. For this reason, I decided to create two additional
models—Comprehensive Model (CM) and Simplified Model (SM)—to address these two
problems.

158
I unpack the two variables that constitute the social capital index and run them
individually with the formal and informal entrepreneurship in the Comprehensive Model.
I decided to try this approach because the problem might originate in the interaction of
the variables that constitute the composite index of social capital. However, I maintain
the three control variables to determine whether the use of the individual variable of
social capital provides different outcomes from the OM. In the Simplified Model, I
address the problem of multicollinearity in the control variables, and use the best variable
that measures social capital based on the findings from the Comprehensive Model.
A.2. Comprehensive Model (CM)
The Comprehensive Model (CM) uses the individual measures, general trust and
organization membership, to represent the informal institutions instead of the composite
index of social capital. It also uses the three individual control variables: economic
development (GDP), political stability, and control of corruption in the estimation.
A.2.1. Issues with the Social Capital Index of Entrepreneurship Growth
The statistical outputs (Appendix B) from the Original Model showed that the
index of social capital is not statistically significant. The results are surprising since
social capital is one of the two important variables in the study and is estimated to have a
positive relation with formal and informal entrepreneurship (e.g., Fountain 1998; Portes
and Haller 2002; Wetzel 1993). The variable social capital used in this study is a
composite index constructed from the two forms of social capital suggested in the
literature to have influence on economic activities, development, and economic growth
(e.g., Social Capital Initiatives 2001; Zak and Knack 2001). The two forms of social
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capital consist of structural (associational or organization membership) and cognitive
(level of generalized trust) forms of social capital. It is borrowed from the measure of
social capital developed by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001).87 The use of index to
measure social capital by merging the two forms of social capital into one index is
common in social capital studies as explained in the main strand of literature (e.g. Coffé
and Geys 2005, Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001, Krishna and Uphoff 1999).88
I suspect that the incoherence between the hypotheses and the outcomes might
have originated from the characteristics of the two forms of social capital as being
distinct but interdependent. They are distinct because each concept has its own meaning
and characteristics: trust represents the cognitive aspect of social capital, whereas
voluntary organization membership embodies the structural aspect of social capital. They
are interdependent because they complement each other, and the two concepts constitute
the two forms of social capital. For that reason, I believe one of the ways to address this
problem is to unpack the index and use the individual measure of social capital to better
understand the impact of each indicator on entrepreneurship. Some scholars suggest that
this is the best way to analyze the effect of social capital because of the distinctness of its
forms, which might have a different impact on the subject to study (e.g., Knack 2002;
Knack & Keefer 1997; Newton 1999).

87

The social capital measure and framework are extensively explained in the “Understanding and
Measuring Social Capital—A Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital
Initiative” by Christian Grootaert and Thierry van Bastelaer (2001). It can be accessed at
www.siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Initiative-WorkingPaper-Series/SCI-WPS-24.pdf
88
Despite the many advantages of index use, index numbers sometimes have limitations. For
examples, the inconsistency of the index due to the incompleteness of some of the data used to calculate the
index might question its accuracy, which affect the outcomes of the regression analysis. As a consequence,
some scholar suggests that index number is better for description because “the change displayed in an index
value is a descriptive measure rather than an inferential statistical process; it describes only a specific
change that has occurred over a specific time period” (McNabb 2004, 303).
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Even though the literature presents the use of composite index and individual
indicators as viable approaches to measure social capital, I decided to try the individual
indicators instead, because the social capital composite index used in the original model
did not provide significant findings about the relationships between entrepreneurship and
institutions. The social capital index did not matter for formal or informal
entrepreneurship. The use of the individual indicators, “trust” and “voluntary
organization membership,” in the Comprehensive Model should show the distinctness of
each measure and its impact on the formal and informal entrepreneurship.
The summary of the findings from the Comprehensive Model shows some
inconsistencies between the hypotheses and the outcomes. For illustrations, H2 predicts
that formal institution is positively related to informal entrepreneurship; however, the
statistical outputs showed that formal institution is not significant for the creation of
informal entrepreneurship. H3 predicts that the level of economic development and
political stability are positively related to formal entrepreneurship; however, the outputs
showed that the relation is not statistically significant; etc.
I believe these inconsistencies are caused by two factors. First, even though the
Comprehensive Model gave us some ideas about the role of social capital—generalized
trust and organization membership on entrepreneurship, the effects of the individual
measure of social capital are not conclusive. The statistical analysis provided unexpected
outcomes about the roles of trust and voluntary organization membership: insignificance
of the relationship when it should be significant and the inconsistency of the actual
coefficient sign with the hypothesized sign. Second, I believe that the Comprehensive
Model has a multicollinearity problem like in the Original Model because the use of the
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three control variables with the individual measures of social capital did not solve the
incoherence of the relationship of the control variables with the two dependent variables.
I will add a third model called “Simplified Model” to address this problem by taking the
most appropriate variable to measure social capital that suits this study and by solving the
multicollinearity problem.
A.3. Simplified Model
Neither the Original Model nor the Comprehensive Model gave a satisfactory
explanation about the effect of formal institutions and informal institutions (Social
Capital—composite index of social capital, generalized trust, and voluntary organization
membership as individual measures) on the formal and informal entrepreneurship. In the
Simplified Measure, I will use the variable voluntary organization membership as a
measure of informal institutions and combines the control variables—economic
development (GDP), political stability, and control of corruption to become a composite
index. The rationale about the use of the above approach is explained as follows.
A.3.1. Voluntary Organization Membership vs. Generalized Trust to Measure
Social Capital for this Study
The use of a composite index constructed by the combination of the cognitive and
structural social capital or the use of individual variables to measure social capital in the
statistical model is common in the study of social capital. For this study, neither approach
provided clear picture about the role of social capital in entrepreneurship. The composite
index of social capital used in the Original Model did not provide significant findings
about the relationships between entrepreneurship and informal institutions. The statistical
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output shows that it does not matter to the formal or informal entrepreneurship. The use
of the two individual measures of social capital [generalized trust and voluntary
organizational membership in the Comprehensive Model gave mixed and unexpected
findings about the effects of generalized trust and voluntary organizational membership
on formal and informal entrepreneurship. For example, voluntary organizational
membership did not matter for formal and informal entrepreneurship; trust was
significant for formal entrepreneurship in the interaction estimation only.
For that reason, I will use one variable only to measure social capital in the
Simplified Model. I will retain the variable voluntary organizational membership
(percentage of population who belongs to at least one voluntary organization) as the best
measure of social capital because it represents informal institutions more accurately for
this study both at the conceptual level as well as at the operationalization level. It will be
used to represent the informal institution as one of the main explanatory variables (formal
institution is the other one) in the model to test the four hypotheses.
A.3.2. Conceptual Level
From a conceptual level, the variable voluntary organization membership is
sufficient to measure social capital for this study because of its association with trust.
Voluntary organization membership is often ascribed a fundamental role in the formation
of social capital (Wollebaek and Selle 2002, 32). It is a source of trust and can generate
and spread trust throughout the society (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000). It has socialization
effects on democratic and cooperative values and norms (Coffé and Geys 2005). It
generates trust and norms of reciprocity, which spread over the whole community,
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affecting even those who are not equally active in associational life (Stolle 2000). For
that reason, some scholars believe that a voluntary organization membership and trust are
conceptually related (e.g., Fukuyama 1995; Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999; Halpern
1999; Putnam 2000; Putnam et al. 1993). This train of thought argues that “voluntary
associations form part of the social infrastructure of society that makes the generation of
trust possible, and that at least makes it easier for trust relations and trusting attitudes to
develop and to re-enforce themselves within the population” (Anheier and Kendall 2002,
344).
In other words, social capital has a dual nature due to the distinctness and
interdependence of the concept of “voluntary organization” and “trust.” From a
conceptual perspective then, I believe that using “voluntary organization membership” as
a measure of social capital should be sufficient and appropriate to analyze the
relationship between entrepreneurship and social capital as a measure of informal
institutions for this study. It is a source of social capital due to the trust and norms of
network generated by it. In addition, the output from the analysis of the correlation of the
two variables confirms the association of trust and voluntary organization membership.
A.3.3. Operationalization Level
The generalized trust index used in this research was constructed by computing
the percentage of people who responded “most people can be trusted” to the question
“generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can be too
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careful in dealing with people?”89 Even though this measure is probably the most widely
and internationally used and the best proxy for the cognitive form of social capital
making international comparison possible (Sabatini 2006), the use of generalized trust to
represent social capital (as a measure of informal institution) for this study might cause a
problem because it can be an indirect reflection of formal institutions quality. It is crucial
to use a measure of formal and informal institutions that are not linked or related.
The generalized trust question is not specific enough to warrant that people did
not include government employees, whom they interact in their daily dealings and policy
makers were excluded from the word “people” when they responded to the above
question. Here, “people” might mean social beings (people that “they know or they do
not know, or a combination of the two), a moral being (association to institutions such as
government employers, political leaders, etc.) or the combination of the two. It might be
difficult to disentangle the relation between the respondents’ perception of “other people”
as social beings, their perceptions of the overall institutions performance, and what they
mean by trust because the concepts of people as social and moral beings seem to go hand
to hand at least to some extent. In other words, “trust” as a cognitive concept of social
capital might represent “the individuals’ perception of people’s social environment,
related to the particular position the interviewed people occupy in the social structure”
(Sabatini 2006, 11). Therefore, I dropped “trust” from the model since it can be an
indirect reflection of the formal institutions, which is already measured by formal
institution—number of procedures to start a business (Mishler and Rose 2001; Newton
and Norris 2000).
89

This question was developed by Rosenberg (1956) and used in the World Value Survey (WVS) and
Afrobarometer.
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Finding the best measure of informal institutions is very important for this
research since I am studying the effect of institutions interaction. If one of the variables
already has some connection with the other, then that will distort the analysis and might
not reflect the accuracy of the findings. The use of the variable—generalized trust as a
proxy measure for social capital might be problematic for this study because of its
implied relationship with formal institutions. It is difficult to separate its sources, forms,
and consequences (Adam and Roncevic 2003; Onyx and Bullen 2001; Sobels et al. 2001)
from the formal institutions. Therefore, it is of the interest of this study to use a measure
that does not have any close connection with the formal institutions as an independent
variable.
The choice of the variable—organizational membership to represent social capital
meets the recommendation about the necessity of determining the best proxy indicator
that represents social capital depending on the purpose of the research (Collier 2002). The
choice of the indicator depends on the concept to be analyzed and the construct
associated with it (Narayan and Cassidy 2001; Collier 2002; Grootaert and Van Bastelaer
2002). Since, the purpose of the research is to determine the effect of individual
institutions (formal and informal) and their interactions on entrepreneurship, it is
important to use measures that are specific such as formal institutions (number of
procedures to start a business) and voluntary organization membership but not measures
that might have implicit relations such as formal institution and trust.
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A.3.4. Issues with Multicollinearty in the Control Variables About Their Relation
with Formal and Informal Institutions
The statistical outputs from the two previous models (Original Model and
Comprehensive Model) show some inconsistencies in the significance of p-values and the
direction of the relationship between the dependent variables (formal entrepreneurship
and informal entrepreneurship) and the three control variables used in the estimation
(level of economic development [GDP],90 political stability, and control of corruption).
These control variables are addressed in the literature to have relationship with
entrepreneurship (e.g., Amoros 2009; Ciccone and Papaioannou 2007; Kaufman and
Kraay 2003). The use of the three variables provides a relative measure that enables
comparison across the variations of countries covered in this study. These control
variables are expected to correlate with one another because of the presence of
approximate relationship between them.
The presence of multicollinearity violates the assumption of the linear
independence of the explanatory variables. It implies that the degree of multicollinearity
leads to estimation problems such as the presence of large variances of the OLS estimates
and specification errors, which are caused by the particularity of the sample available
(Kennedy 2008). Multicollinearity is at work whenever the regression coefficients do not
correspond to the hypothesized signs; changes in regression coefficients for given
variables occur when an independent variable is dropped or added; the correlation
coefficients indicate the presence of high correlations between the explanatory variables;
or variables that are known to be important in the analysis have insignificant p-value

90

GDP PPP per capita.
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(Kennedy 2008; Manheim and Rich 1981). These multicollinearity symptoms occurred in
the Original and Comprehensive Model.
For that reason, a test of pairwise correlation was conducted to determine the level
of correlation between the three control variables. The results indicate a significant,
strong, and positive correlation among them. The level of economic development (GDP)
was significantly and positively related to political stability (r = 0.72, p < 0.00), and
control of corruption (r = 0.85, p < 0.00). Political stability exhibited positive significant
relationships with control of corruption (r = 0.85, p < 0.00). In other words, the
relationship among the control variables is approximately linear. The estimation is
suffered by the multicollinearity problem due to the high correlation among the control
variables.
To address this problem, I will form a composite index of control variable, which
is one of the techniques that Kennedy (2008) suggested when dealing with
multicollinearity since the three variables (level of economic development [GDP],
political stability, and control of corruption) are crucial in business creation at the
macro/country level (e.g., Anokhin & Schulze 2009; Fosu 1992, Kuznets 1966; Reynolds
et al. 2003). He suggests that “the variables that are collinear could be grouped together
to form a composite index capable of representing this group of variables by itself. Such a
composite variable should be created only if the variables included in the composite have
some useful combined economic interpretation; otherwise, the empirical results will have
little meaning” (Kennedy 2008, 197).
I believe the formation of composite index of control variables (economic
development, political stability, and control of corruption) is the best approach for this
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study because it allows us to control the economic and political variables that affect
entrepreneurship and institutions more effectively. It will transform the three variables in
one score using factor analysis procedure. Even though the use of the unitary measures
makes it difficult to interpret the individual contribution of the three control variables, it
will eliminate the multicollinearity problem. The difficulty in interpreting the relative
contribution of the individual variables should not matter for this study because the three
variables are used as control variables but not explanatory variables. Instead, the use of
the composite index facilitate the understanding of the effect of institutions on
entrepreneurship because the three variables become one unit that will be held constant in
order to assess or clarify the relationships between entrepreneurship and institutions.
To summarize, the Simplified Model will have the following variables. The
dependent variables comprise formal entrepreneurship and informal entrepreneurship.
The independent variables consist of the number of procedures to start business as a
measure of formal institutions and voluntary organization membership as a measure of
informal institutions. The control variables will be an index of economic and political
factors that affect entrepreneurship (factor analysis score). It is a combination of the level
of economic development (GDP PPP per capital), political stability, and control of
corruption. The findings from the Simplified Model are robust because they are
consistent in the boostrapping and multiple regression approaches. The analysis of the
findings from the Simplified Model is found the Chapter II of this dissertation.

Appendix B
Summary of the Statistical Outputs from the Three Models
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Summary of the Statistical Outputs from the Three Models

Variables

Formal
Institution
Social Capital
Index
Economic
Development
Political
Stability
Control of
Corruption
Trust
Voluntary
Organization
membership
Political and
Economic
Development
Index
(Control
Variables)
Formal
Institution
Social Capital
Index
Economic
Development
Political
Stability
Control of
Corruption
Trust
Voluntary
Organization
membership
Political and
Economic
Development
Index
(Control
Variables)

Model
Original
Comprehensive
Simplified
Statistical
Coefficient
Statistical
Coefficient
Statistical
Coefficient
Significance
Sign
Significance
Sign
Significance
Sign
H1: Determinant of Formal Entrepreneurship (Individual Estimation)
Yes*
–
Yes*
–
Yes*
–
Yes**

–

No

–

No

–

No

–

No

–

Yes*

+

Yes*

+

No
Yes**

–
–

No

–

Yes**

+

H2: Determinant of Informal Entrepreneurship (Individual Estimation)
No
+
No
+
Yes

–

Yes**

–

Yes*

–

Yes*

–

No

+

No

+

Yes*

–

Yes*

–

No
Yes**

–
+

Yes*

+

Yes*

–
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Variables

Formal
Institution
Social
Capital Index
Economic
Development
Political
Stability
Control of
Corruption
Trust
Voluntary
Organization
membership
Political and
Economic
Development
Index
(Control
Variables)
Institutional
Mix
Trust and
Formal
Institution
Voluntary
Organization
and Formal
Institution
Formal
Institution
Social
Capital Index
Economic
Development
Political
Stability
Control of
Corruption
Trust
Voluntary
Organization
membership

Model
Original
Comprehensive
Simplified
Statistical
Coefficient
Statistical
Coefficient
Statistical
Coefficient
Significance
Sign
Significance
Sign
Significance
Sign
H3: Determinant of Formal Entrepreneurship (Interaction Estimation)
Yes*
–
Yes*
–
Yes*
–
No

–

No

–

No

–

No

–

No

–

Yes**

+

Yes*

+

Yes*
Yes*

–
–

No

No

–

Yes*

+

No

+

–
Yes*

+

Yes*

+

H4: Determinant of Informal Entrepreneurship (Interaction Estimation)
No
+
Yes*
+
No
No

–

Yes**

–

Yes*

–

No

+

Yes**

+

Yes*

–

Yes*

–

No
No

+
+

No

+

+
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Variables
Political and
Economic
Development
Index
(Control
Variables)
Institutional
Mix
Trust and
Formal
Institution
Voluntary
Organization
and Formal
Institution
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.10.

Original
Statistical
Coefficient
Significance
Sign

Yes*

Model
Comprehensive
Statistical
Coefficient
Significance
Sign

Simplified
Statistical
Coefficient
Significance
Sign
Yes*
–

+
Yes**

–

No

–

No

–

